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I. Introduction 
:'4. . The Problem 
"College Expenses Rise; Gifts Decline", "Colleges 
See.k New Sources of Revenue", ''l'uitions Raised As Colleges 
Seek New Sources of Revenue 11 , "Colleges Take Forced Flier 
into Stocks". These have been the headlines on stories con-
cerning college fina.nces for the past. fift.een or twenty 
y ears. American colleges and universities have found them-
selves in recent. y ears in a vastly more difficult period as 
far as raising funds for college operations is concerned. 
The colleges were rudely awakened from the com-
placency engendered by the favorable and sound bond position 
of the 1920's. Depression brought an end tc the ease of 
management of portfolios composed m9:inl y of high-grade bonds 
and preferred s~ocks. 
Out of the chao.s left by default and failure, in-
vestment committ.ees had to turn to new investment media . 
I nterest ln equities wa.s stimulated and has continued to the 
present.. Other problems have arisen in more recent years--
particularly during the Second World War with its sca.rcit.y 
of favorable securities and during the inflation period 
which followed the war. 
In t h is post -we.r period the colleges were faced 
with increases in every item of expense. T o meet this 
mounting f i nancial burden the colleges turned. to increased 
fees for tuition and board-and-room, government. research 
10. 
contracts, and sustained p~eas to a~umni for increased gifts. 
During this period high-grade bonds, preferreds, 
and other "sound" inve s tment.s have continued to show small 
yields. The problem has been made more comp~ex with a large-
scale redemption of issues with long-term maturities at attrac-
~ive interest rates and a replacement of these issues with 
securities of shorter term and less attractive yie~ds. As 
these issues have been withdrawn from the portfolios, the 
need for reinvestment of the idle cash at best possible y ield 
has arisen. So the trend t .oward equities continues unabat.ed. 
In addition t.o grea.tly increased holdings of common 
stocks, many colleges have turned to other and even more 
unusual fields of investment. Am ong those t.o. receive atten-
tion have been the ventures into ownership of corporations 
undertaken by many large and prominent universities. Other 
instft uti ons have increased their holdings of real estat,e. 
Still others e.re using collage dormitories as fields for in-
vestment. Vmen the trend away from t.he old stand-by s, bonds 
and pref·erred stoc.ks, will reach it.s crest noone knows. 
' •ibether common stocks will continue t .o hold such a prominent 
p osition in investment portfolios in the future, particularly 
if the stock market should once again suffer e major decline 
and if deflation inst.ead of inflet.ion should be the issue, is 
difficult to say. But one problem continues~ how in the 
face of ever-increasing expenses and recurring deficits can 
11. 
the colleges obtain the income needed. to continue their in-
stituti ons free from government support and/or control. 
One other problem also faces college finance off 1-
cers. With the complex ities of modern investment problems, 
with endowment funds st anding at the hi ghest figures in h i s-
tory , with the ar t, of sound i nvestment becoming more refined 
wi th each passing ye a r, and with the ever-present shadow of 
an eventual depression or a recession after a fifteen-y e ar 
b oo m hovering in the background, how can tre a surers and f i -
nance committees best invest college money in terms of pre-
servation of capit al, y i eld, d i versificat i on, and the best 
method for weathering both long-term inflation on the one 
h e.nd and deflation on t. h e ot h e r hand . Th i s phase of t he 
p r o ol em h as been e mphasi zed more and more of re cent y e ars . 
As co l leges t .urn t o inve s t ment counse l , mut ual i n ves tment 
companies, formula plans, and other scientific tools to be 
used in the wise selection of securities and the formulation 
of a b alanced pro gram, i t becomes clear that the problem 
f a cing colleges and universities in 1952 is in reality two 
problems: 1 ) how to invest their money to secure the best 
p ossible yield, and 2) how to invest t.heir money wisely to 
preserve and safe guard the principal without undue fluctua-
tion in the market value of their capit a l. 
B . S i gnificance of Problem 
The very significance of this investment prob lem 
12. 
has been demonstrated by the attention which has been accorded 
it in the past years by all interested organi z ations. This 
problem h~:~. s been u.ppermost in the statements of college treas-
urers, in meetings of college associations and conferences, 
and in various other educational media. During the studies 
made for the preparation of this paper it was noted that 
business magaz ines and newspapers have given the problem 
serious consideration. Much work has been done by the .Amari-
can Council on Education Studies through its Financial Advi-
sory Service. This Service was originally set up to investi-
gate the problem of college endowment fund investments 
thoroughly and to attempt. to show to the colleges what was 
being done in this field. 
Various investment firms# have made special studies 
of individual college portfolios in attempts to advise their 
institutional clients in this field. College Finance commit-
tees have spent long hours working out formula plans, diversi-
fication policies, etc. It was noted in reading many 
treasurers' reports that the t.reasurers themselves are keenly 
interested in the problem and its solution. 
But perhaps the main significance of this problem 
of college investments lies in its effect on the nation as a 
whole. It is no exaggeration t.o say that upon the solution 
of this problem depends the continuation of higher education 
#such as the George Putnam Fund; Scudder, Stevens and Clark; 
Wood, S truthers and Co. 
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as we now know it. The independent colleges have felt the 
most pressure upon their income -producing sources. If these 
inst i tutions cannot meet ~heir expenditures from ~he usual 
sources and continu.e to count on an adequate rate of income 
fro m their investments, they face two alternatives: 1) 
closing the college, or 2) accepting government aid and 
submission with the possible loss of academic freedom. 
C. Prior Work in The Field 
Certain aspects of the over-all_ problem of invest -
ment as disclosed in Section A have been undertaken in the 
pa.st by various firms and inst.itutions. No complete study 
has been made, however, of all the aspects of this problem 
by any of the organizations studied in the prepara.tion of this 
paper. Perhaps the most valuable contribution to this field 
was made by t.he -American Council on Education Stud.ies t .hraugh 
its Financj_al Advisory Service . It pubLished several studies 
by J. Harvey Cain. · Three of these have been especially valu-
a.ble as background material for this paper: 1) ncollege and 
University Investments and Income 1985-1941 .. , 8) "What is 
Happening to College and University Invest-ments and Income", 
and 3) "College Investments Under War Conditions". Unfor-
tunately, the work of t .he Financial Advisory Service has been 
terminat-ed and the latest available stud.y by the Service 
ended in 1943 . 
14. 
Early work in this field was made by Wood, S truthers 
and co., who published a "Survey on College Investments" in 1931. 
The firm of S cudder, Stevens and Clark published an e xcellent 
"S urve y of University and College Endowment Funds" in 1947. 
The purpose of this study was to per mit the managers of uni-
versi ty and college endowment funds to review how most. other 
importantly endowed institutions have met various problems. 
This survey gave careful study to the breakdown in the o9 
large colleges among high -grade securit .ie s, s.enior risk secu-
rities, common stocks, and real estat.e mortgages. 
Work on one pha.se of this problem has been rat.her 
carefully done by Lucile Tomlinson of Barrens. She has 
written a book entitled "Successful Investing Formulas" 
which goes into considerable detail regarding many of the 
more prominent. institutional formula plans. 
S tudies of individual colleges in certain aspects 
of their endowment. fund investment have been made by various 
investment firms. Formal work in this field has, however, 
been limited wit.h the result that. no periodical or newspaper 
reference was too insignificant to e x amine. 
D. Method of Ap proach 
In organi z ing t..his s.tudy, contact with s.ome 2 2 
colleges representing the largest endowment funds in the 
country was made. These colleges were chos.en far this 
study from the Americen Council on Education St.udies' 
listing of the 22 c:olleges with the largest. end.owment.s. 
From these colleges w·as. requested, and for the most part 
15. 
obtained, investment records contained in treasurers' re-
ports for certain key years to be covered in the study: 
1926, 1931, 1936, 1941, 1946, and 1951. The attempt. in 
this study has been to follow the changes and trace their 
significance through the last 25 years--an attempt. to show· 
present t .rends and investment positions. 
Under this a pproach the idea has been to study 
some college plans that have been exceptione.lly successful--
formula plans used, unusual investments which have boosted 
endowment fund income, the personal use of investment 
c aunsel, etc. 
The following list of colleges and universities 
indicates those who have complied with the re quest for 
financial data: 
Berea College 
Bowdoin College 
Brown University 
Carnegie Institute of T echnology 
Catholic University of America 
University of Chicago 
Dartmouth College 
Harvard University 
Massachuset,t s Instit.ute of Technology 
New York Universit.y 
Oberlin College 
Smith College 
16. 
Stanford University 
Union Theological Semlnary 
Vanderbilt University 
Wellesley College 
The institutions selected for this list were also studied 
by the Financial Advisory Service of the American Council 
on Education Studies. These colleges were chosen because 
t-hey were in the group of the 22 having t.he largest endow-
ment. funds and needing soundest investment policies. It 
is hoped that their experiences will prove valuable t.o 
other inst.it.ut.ions. Many other colleges have been men-
tioned at one point or another in this work t .o show how 
certain colleges have successfully met certain investment 
problems. 
This paper, then, has attempted to approach the 
college investment problem in two ways: 
1) By t .racing the "changing emphasi.s in college 
endowment investments" and ather fundamental changes from 
1926 to 1951.. 
2) By pointi.ng out what has been done by some 
colleges in related fields in order to improve quality, 
yield, and safety of investment. 
The following six chapters relate the changes 
from the past t _o_ the present.. The closing chapters of the 
paper deal with techniques e.dopted by some colleges. 
17. 
II. The College Investment A~titude and Trend ~926-~930 
rn order t .o evaluate trends in college endowment 
investments from the base year of 1926 chosen for t.his 
study through the latest financia~ report availabl.e--that 
of June 30, ~951--an analysis has been made of the financial 
reports of the colleges contacted in the study. It was de-
cided to restrict ~he study to these colleges in ~he belief 
that the larger endowments might offer more constructive 
points in the way of mana gement 1 diversification, and anal-
yses than those colleges with smal~er endowments might offer. 
A. Comparison_£! the Reports of 
Colleges Included in This Study 
From the ~ist of colleges chosen the following 
colleges were a-ble to. comply with the req_uest for 1926 
treasurers' report.s and financial statements: Berea College, 
Bowdoin College, Stanford University, Vanderbilt University, 
and Wellesley Col~ege. The tables at the end of this che.p-
ter set forth some of the more pertinent dat.a obtained from 
these reports. 
A glance at T ab~e I shows the re~iance placed on 
bonds in the year ~926. As stated in the introduction, the 
problem of investing endowment funds in the base period of 
this study was considerably simpler than at the present time. 
Most of the bonds held in the portfolios of the colleges 
studted had excellent y ie~ds and provided the colleges with 
a high degree o.f safety and an adequate yield. One of t.he 
18. 
colleges studied had a yield of almost 5 1/2 per cent with 
al.most 80 per cent of its portfolio in bonds. The high 
percent age of common stock equity in a portfolio wa s a mere 
3.8 per cent and one of the colleges studied held no co mmon 
stock s at all. In the following chapters the progress of 
these five inst.itutions will be shown as well as the inclusion 
of f ·i gure s from many of the other institutions. Most of the 
colleges reporting for 1926 as shown in Table II derived a b out 
50 per cent of their tote:l income from endowment funds. Only 
one of the colleges studied had a percentage of total income 
from endowments far below 50 per cent--that particular colle ge 
deri ved 63 per cent o f i~s i n co me fro m it s student b ody. The 
perce nt a ge of i n come obtai n e d from student s var i e d consider-
abl y and n o cle a r pattern was di scernabl e . Only one college 
r eporte d any substantial portion of it s income obtained from 
gifts and grants. 
B. Compa.rlson of Results of This Studv 
With Result.s of Other Studies Covering_ 
A Comparable T ime Period 
One study of the rate of return obtained by selected 
colleges in 1926 showed the following information: 
Maximum yield 9 •. 80 per cent 
Mean 5.00 per cent 
Median 4 .99 per cent 
Minimum yield 2.64 per cent ~{-
In comparison with these figures we would find 
tha~ two of the colleges in the present survey had a yield 
·:s<- 6, p • 21 . 
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below t.he minimum yield and the ot.her three were close to 
the mean. 
The rate of return as found. by another study wa s 
as follows: 
1 9 26 . 
1927 . 
1 9 28 . 
1929 • 
1930 . 
. • 5 .14. 
5. 24 
. . . . 5.15 
5.08 
• 5.16 ~~ 
It may t h us be seen from available data prep ared 
covering that period t.hat.. colleges enjoyed on the average 
a f airly comfort.able rat,e of return and the problems which 
were soon to be set endowment fund officers were still on 
t h e h ori z on. 
One report b a sed on a study of 12 colieges' endow-
ments for the year ending . June 30, 1930 showed t.he followin g 
averag e percentages of investment: 
Bonds 
Real Estate 
Preferred St.ocks 
Co mmon Stock s 
q6.2 
15.1 
9.4 
18.1 
per cent 
per cent 
per cent 
per cent.·:H<-
A simil a r study of the investments of Harvard. Universit y dis-
closed that Harvard had the following investment percent ages 
of 1 t .s endowment. fund for the year ending .June. 30, 1930: 
Bonds 
Preferred Stocks 
Common Stocks 
Re a l Est ate 
Short-Term Loe.ns 
-::4, p.26 . 
.;Ha l, p .ll. 
~HHfl2 , p .l8. 
. 
50 . 3 per cent 
5.9 per cent 
2 2.7 per cent 
14. 9 per cent. 
6.2 per cent -3~~~~f 
·20. 
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A comparison of these figures for 1930 with those of 1926 
discussed earlier in the chapter discloses that the effect 
of t.he depression had not as yet made itself felt in college 
endowment investments. The average percent invested in bonds 
in 1930 is onl.y slightly less than that indicat.ed in Table I 
for 1926. The amount invested in preferred stocks shows some 
increase as d.oes the amount invested in common st.ocks. but 
no marked change appears to have taken place in the majority 
of college portfolios during this period from 1926 to 1930. 
The analysis of the Harvard portfolio referred to above dis-
closes t.hat. Harvard's position was slightly different than 
the average--having only half of its investment in bonds, a 
lesser amount than the average in preferred stocks. and a 
somewhat greater amount invested in common stocks. 
The experiences of the Harvard University endow-
ment fund--largest of the college endowment funds--provide 
an interesting sidelight on the growth of t.he investment 
management problem as a whole and in particular as it af·-
fects Harvard's investment policies. In an excellent article 
on the Harvard Endowment Fund by Paul C. Cabot and Leonard C. 
Larrabee, the history of the fund is traced briefly . .;~ 
In 1831 in a fund aggregating half a million 
-::-20 , p • 6 29 . 
dollars only about three per cent of the total_ was invested 
in common stocks--the bulk of the invested funds were in 
notes and mortgages. By 1850 the investment account had 
grown to some 11>872, 000 and there was much greate~ di versi-
fication in the security holdings. Bank stocks, textile 
stocks, two railroads, and e few government and municipal 
securities were favored. By 1870 bonds comprised some 23 per 
cent of all investments. In 1881 a treasurer who liked real 
estate tied up some 40 per cent of Harvard's investment ac-
count in real estate including -the corner of Washington and 
Summer St.reets in Boston, now occupied by Jo.rdan Marsh Com-
pany . It was only under recent treasurer, Charles Francis 
Adams, that common stock began to have a significant.. ple_ce 
in the portfolio and the pol icy of purchase and sale of com-
mon stocks was continued during this first period under 
study, 1926-1930. 
During this period Harvard's investments in bonds 
fell from some 70 per cent of the total portfol io to 61 per 
cent j_n 1 930. Real e s -t a te and pref e rred stocks r e me. i n e d 
a b out the s a me --1 3 a.nd 6 per c ent respectively . Common 
s t ocks wr i c h a ccount .. ed fo r only 11 per cent of the portfolio 
in 1926 rose to some 21 per cent in 1930. From the above 
it is easy to see that, during the 1920's when high-grade 
bonds were easily obtainable at at.tract.ive yields, Harvard 
took full benefit of the situation. Dur i ng the late 1920's 
22. 
Harvard still had a ~raditional and conservative distrust of 
common stocks--happily so in 1929. It took the depression 
year of 1930, however, to up the proportion of common stocks 
from 1.4 per cent. to 21 per cent. of the portfolio. One result 
of the depression W8.S an almost. doubling of Harvardt s invest-
ment in common at.ocks during this period. In the late 1920's 
there was no special category for Unit.ed St-ates Government 
bonds, a category which in later years was to become exceed-
ingly important. 
In closing this brief glance at the year 1926 a.s 
reflected in coll.ege financial. reports we may observe that. 
the period from 1926 t,o 1930 was marked on ~he whole by 
conservatism on t.he part. of financial officers as reflected 
in t,he large holdings of bonds. As noted earlier, these few 
years were. rela.tively easy ones for managers of endowment 
funds and the problems of investment. which were to confront 
them in lat.er years only started t.o appear with the advent. 
of the great. depression. The situation as it st.ood in 1931 
after almost. two years of depression and the depression 
years to follow is shown in t .he following chapters and in 
the gl.oomy financial report.s which were 1 ssued during ~hat. 
period. 
23. 
Table I 
Percent.~Di stribution of Inv.~tment~..1..Y:E_e For E i ght Coll~es 
(Based on Book Value) 
A:t June 30, 1926, J3.nd _Ayerage Ylelds For The Year Ending__..:[Uf1~_30._ ],926 
College Cash and Bonds Stocks Real Total Average 
Number Short. T erm Preferred c 0 !!!ill.Qll E st. ate Return 
1. 0.2% 41.9% 52.0;1o(l) 3.8io 2.1 % lOO.Ofo 2.471~ 
2. 2.4 79.2 10.3 .1 8.0 100.0 5.38 
9. - 70.1 5 •. 8 11.2 12.9 100.0 ( 2) 
10. 1.0 73.5 2. 2 18.2 6.7 100.0 ( 2) 
14. 3.8 73.9 0.2 0.2 21.9 100.0 4.82 
15 . 
-
65.8 23.7 1.7 8.8 100.0 (2) 
16. 1.1 88.0 - -· 10.9 100.0 4.95 
17. 1 3.9 75.0 1.5 3.8 4 •. 2 100.0 4. 23 
Av~r:~ge 2.6 70.9 12 •. 1 4.9 9.5 100.0 4.37 
(1) 99fo of this figure in Aluminum Company of America. Much of the Alcoa investment 
was warrants which did not produce any income for 1926. 
( 2) Information not obtainable from reports received. 
Source: College Treasurers' Reports for the year ended June 30 •. 1926. 
~ 
• 
Tabla II 
Book Value of Six College Endowment Funds a~ June 30, 1926 
College Number Total Endowment Fund 
1. $ 7,331,093 
2. 4,097,337 
14. 28,917,532 
15. 7,466,545 
16. 8,883,872 
17. 8,300,496 
So.urce: College Treasurers' Reports for the year ended 
June 30, 1926 . 
Table III 
Chief Sources_££_Income For Six Colleges For The Year 
End.ing June~ 1926, Expressed as Per Cents 
Cell~ From From From Gifts Other Total 
Number Endowm~ St. ud.ent.s And Grants 
1. 48.8 8.8 39 .0 3.4 100.0 
2. 48.7 40.8 7.9 2.6 100.0 
9. 42.7 33.5 13.2 10.6 1.00.0 
14. 51 .• 9 36.1 6.1 5.9 100.0 
16. 47.2 50 •. 2 0.6 2.0 100.0 
17. 28. 3 63 •. 0 0.1 8.6 100.0 
.Averase 44.6 38.7 11.2 5.5 100.0 
Sour~: College Treasurers' Reports for the year ended 
June 30, 1926. 
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III. The. College Investment Attitude and Trend, 1931-1935 
A.___9omparison of The Reports of The_folle~Included in 
This Study; 1931 Reports Contrasted With Prior Years. 
The period from 193l t,h.rough 1935 shows in a 
much more pronounces way the changing emphasis in college 
endowment investments which has been going on since that 
time until the present. The same techniques were used with 
regard to t.he various college financial reports as were used 
in connection with those reports for the fiscal year 1.926. 
A comparison of these figures with those for 1926 reveals 
some diff"erence s had t .aken place in almost all college 
port.folios . However, "kypica1. t ,reasure.rs' reports. for l931 
comfort. the reader by relating t.he high percentages carried 
in bond.s and the wisd.om of financial committ,ee s in avoiding 
common stocks. 
Common stocks were in a relatively· less import.ant. 
position percentage -wise in 1931 than in 1926· in the port.-
f"olios of the colleges reporting for both years.# Real es-
tate also took a smaller per cent of endowment f"und invest.-
ments as finance committ.ees came to appreciate the fact 
that real estate was no longer the a·ttractive investment of 
t .he 1920t s. Yields for the colleges st..udied held up very 
well for 193l based on book values. 
The income. obtained from inve st.ed fund.s changed 
considerably in it.s relation t,o t .ot.al inco.me in the colleges 
for which a comparison can be made. One college found that 
#See Tables. IV and VI at end of chapter. 
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its endowment income accounted for 72. per cent of its tote.l 
income in 1931 wherea s it had accounted for only 49 per cent 
of its income in 1926. .Another college found that it.s en-
dowment income accounted for 60 per cent. of its total in-
come in 1931 as compare d with 4? per cent in 1926. This 
increase was due in large part t .o lower income from students 
and also t .o the fact that endowment fund. income was main-
t ained at. a fair level for the year 1931. 
B . .A Comparison of The Results of This Study With The Re-
~ult .s of Ot.her Studies Covering a Comparable Time Period. 
An excellent survey of the inves~ment portfolios 
of thirty universities and colleges was made in 1931 by 
Wood, Struthers & Co. e.nd showed the following percentages 
of book value invested as follows: 
Bonds 
Cash 
Preferred St.o cks 
Common St .ock s 
Real Estate Mortgages, etc. 
50.5% 
2.5fo 
8.5% 
11 .. 5% 
27 .O% -;~ 
A comparison with the colleges listed in Table IV shows a 
much smaller percentage invested in bonds than for the col-
leges studied here and. a correspondingly greater percentage 
investment in preferred stocks and common stocks. Average 
yields far 45 institutions for the period. from 1931 to 1935 
were as follows: 
1931 
1932 
1.933 
1934 
1935 
-l(- 6, p. 19. 
->H:· 3 , p . 32. 
5. 27 
5.06 
4 .. 58 
4 .• 39 
4 •. 42 ~'·~E-
Zl. 
Once again a comparison of t .he average yield in 1931 as 
above w·ith that. in Table IV discloses that the colleges 
in this study he.d slightly less than the average yield at 
that time. The average figures on rate of return reflect 
the depressed condition of the investment market from 1932 
through 1934 and show the st.art. of a leveling-off period 
which was to last for the next ten years--a leveling-off 
period made possible by the wider diversification of col-
lege endowment fund investments and a departure from the 
favored bond position which had prevailed in the 1920's 
and early 1930's . 
.Anot.her study which compared the last pre-depression 
year with that of t.he year having t.he low point of t.he de-
pression--19 33--discloses the following figures: 
!922_ !933 1936 
Bonds 45.2% 42.4% 39.5% 
Preferred. St.ocks 5.9 7.9 9.0 
Common Stocks 12.6 16.9 20.6 
Real Estate Including 
Mort gages 30.6 27.9 25.6 
Miscellaneous 
_2!-l 4.9 5.3 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0~~ -\~ ,, 
A gle.nce at the above table reveals that since 1929 a de-
cline has occurred in the percent ag e of bond holdings. In 
these early years under study, investment committees had the 
policy of d.epending up on a properly dist.ribut.ed. list. of 
high-g rade bonds in order t.o provide safety of principle 
-l*' 1, p. 44. 
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and a fair rate of income consistently maintained. An in-
crease i _n the percentage on common and preferred stocks was 
also disclosed by this study. The reasons for the increase 
in the light of the economic conditions ex isting in that 
period. pro be.bly were:· l) investment committees might have 
tried to recover capital lost during the deflation period 
by purchasing equities at e. fairly low price with the hope 
of capital ga.in; 2) investment cornmi t tees may have pur-
chased common stocks in order t .o hedge against possible in-
flation; or, 3) investment committees may have purchased 
common stoc.ks because of their confidence in the part.i cular 
stocks. The same study quoted above disclosed the following 
yields on various classes of investments for 33 colleges: 
Class of Investments Rates of Ret.urn 
1,929 1933 1936 
Bonds 5 •. 1% 4.81c 4.4% 
Prefe.rred St,ocks 5.3 3.7 3.4 
Common Stocks. 7.7 3.0 4.3 
Real Estate 4.7 3.2 3.5 
Mortgages and Real 
Estate Bonds 5.8 4.2 4.1 .. ;~ 
The above table reveals a sharp decline in income from both 
common and preferred stocks during the period from 1929 t .o 
1933. Yields on common stocks made gradual gains from 1933 
to 1936. However, the yields on preferred's cont.inued t-o 
decline. Possibly the common stocks were more responsive 
t.o business cycle fluctuations. Dividend payments were 
"" 1, p. 45. 
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resumed for many stocks toward the close of the period under 
study in this chapt.er. Diminishing interest in nreferred 
.. 
stocks can -be seen because for t .he three years above pre-
ferred's produced an average yield of fo.ur per cent while 
common stocks were yielding 4.7 per cent. 
s disclosed previously in t.he chapt.er, the above 
study confirms a decline in t.he amount of real estate held 
by the inst.it.utions studied. The increase in the cash posi-
tion from 1929 to 1935 indicates a great..er degree of h esi-
t an cy in making i nvestment purchases. Inve stment co mmittees 
found the mselve s force d to spend more time s tudy i ng securitie s 
and deliberating their merits before making invest.ment de-
cisions because of the increased risk involved. The survey 
mentioned above disclosed the following trends in the fields 
of investment during this period:- 1.) increases occurred in 
industrials, ut.il ities, Uni t.ed St..ate s Government bonda, bank 
and financial stocks, and institutional propert.ies; 2) de-
creases occurred in percentages of railroad stocks and bonds 
and in real estate. 
C. Other Material P'ertaining to The Period 1.931-1935 
The situation confronting most American colleges 
was high-lighted by E x-President Herbert Hoover in early 
1936. 1r- Hoover t .old Stanford University why he want..ed it. to 
start_ buying common stocks to hold as investments. Its return 
-; ~ 24 , p • 4 6 • 
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on fixed investments had dropped orie-fifth from 4.89 per 
cent in 1.928 t .o 3. 95 per cent. in 1.935. . Within the' next 
five years two-thirds of Stanforctts investment wa.s either 
maturing or was subject to call. To reinvest in bonds 
would mean a loss of about one -fourth of the annual income. 
Needless to say, this. situation was not unique to Stanford 
as almost. all corporations were calling in their long-term 
hi gh-yiel.d bond is sues for refinancing on a short.er-term 
lower-yield basis. Hoover fe~t. that. to go into s:tocks 
might at ~east protect. the college a gainst losses from in-
flation. 
In t ,his Senne period the Association o.f .American 
Colleges surveying 215 instit,utions, with to.tal endowment 
funds of ~ 700,000,000 in 1934, found their prudent, treas-
urer s had inve ste.d as follows: 
Bonds 
Mortgages 
Real Estate 
Common Stocks 
Preferred Stocks 
M i s.cell ane o.us 
Notes 
50.00% 
21.70 
10.40 
5.13 
9.06 
6.75 
• 96 1~ 
Newsweek noted that with this setup most of them could not. 
make ends meet and the return from that, 71 per cent embedded 
in bonds and mortga ges would not rise. 
Another study -:H~ o.f the situation in early 1936 re-
veal.ed that industrial securities were most favored by 
.;~ 24, p. 47. 
-;H~ 11 , p • 1.1 • 
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colleges. Railroads, in which the heaviest investments had 
been made before the depression, suffered the greatest de-
cline in popularity, with the exception of foreign bonds. 
Among bond investments, those of Public Utili ties were fa·-
vored. 
In an article analyzing the changes in the port--
folios of 12 colleges from 1930 to 1936 some comment.s per-
tinent to t,he situation in the early 1 930 's were made. 
Ext .ent to which t .he yi.eld on 
college endowments has declined since the 
high point of t.he 1920's varies a great. 
deal among different institutions. In 
general, smaller institutions have been 
harder hit than t.he larger ones. Part of 
t.he decline in endowment income is due to 
the inclusion in security portfolios of 
bonds, interest. on which is in default .• 
Most of these are railroad or foreign bonds 
purchased 10 years ago or so but the call-
ing of high-coupon bonds and preferred 
stocks in order to refund them a~ lower 
rat es is presenting a very real problem 
to t ,he colleges. 
In general, however, bonds and 
real estate investments have been reduced 
proportionately since 1.9 30 while preferred 
and co mmon stock holdings have been in-
creased. The larger colleges appear more 
inclined to buy common stocks than do t,he 
smaller ones. U. S . Governmen~ bonds were 
almost compLetely ig~o.red. by colle ge fi-
nance commi tt.ee s back in 1930 . 
Of all types of corp orate secu-
rities, railroad preferred stocks are now 
least p op ular among the college s. Most fa-
vored bonds now are those of public utility 
corporations in which medium the group of 
colleges had invested about. 20fo of ~heir 
total endowments in a slight increase over 1930. ~;-
-::- ll , . p • 11 . 
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The period under study in this chapter was a try-
ing one indeed for investment officers. As all of the stu-
dies q uote d have shown, yields had fallen; high-yieLd bonds 
were being called in; the countory we.s in the depths of de-
pression; college income was dro pping; and many other un-
favorable factors were present.. It is little wonder then 
tha t this period from 1931 to 1935 was high-lighted by the 
search for new invest.ment mediums. 
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Table IV 
Percentage Di~trtbution of Investments By Type Fo!:_Nin!LQ_o:Ueges 
(Based on Book Value) 
At June 301. 1931, and ~verage Yields For The Year E ndi_ng__J'"llfl.~ _30, 1931 
College Cash and Bonds Stocks Real Total fAve~~ 
Number Short. Term Preferred Q_Qffi_lllQll ]fst_e~te Retlli:!l 
1. 3.81o 76.6fo 0.2fo 0 •. 7(1) 18.71o lOO.Ofo 4.4% 
2. 0.2 44.8 26.4 17.1 11.5 100.0 5.3 
7. 
-
36.1 3 .5 33.5 26.9 100,0 4.83 
9. - 60,4 6.1 23.4 10.1 100.0 ( 2) 
10. - 70.8 2.8 23.6 2.8 100.0 ( 2) 
14. 1..5 74.2 0.2 0 •. 3 23. 8 100.0 4.73 
15. - 60.1 25.3 3.8 10.8 100.0 (2) 
16. - 87.1 3.5 1..7 7.7 100.0 4.52 
17. 5.4 79.7 3.4 10.1 1.4 1.00,0 5.48 
Average 1.2 65.6 7.9 12.7 12.6 100.0 4.88 
(1) Aluminum Co. of ~r'\merica Common Stock--Book Value :J;9400; Market Value ~?1 .043,400. 
(2) Information no.t . obtainable from reports received. 
Source: College Treasurers' Reports far the year ended June 30, 1931. 
--
~ 
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Tabla V 
Book Value of Seven Coll~e Endowment Funds at. June 30 , 1931 
College Number Total Endowment Fund 
l. ·~ 9. 515.215 \tt> 
2. 6,337,487 
4. 15,835,343 
14. 30,845,416 
15. 8, 7 69,023 
16. 19,853,820 
17. 9,389.245 
Sour~: College Treasurers' Reports for the year ended 
June 30, 1931 
Table VI 
Chief Sources of Income Fgr Seven Colleges For The Year 
Endin~ June 301 19311 Ex:eressed as Per Cents 
of Tot.a1 Income 
Colle5e From FrQr:!!. From Gifts Other Totai 
Number Endowments. St,udents And Granll 
1. 72.1% 5.2% 22.4% o. 3% lOO.Ofo 
2. 49.6 33.9 5.1 11.4 1 00.0 
7. 40.9 44.4 10.5 4.2 100.0 
9. 39.8 35.5 13.9 10.8 100.0 
14 .. 43.4 38.4 15.3 2.9 100.0 
16. 60.3 30.1 5.7 3.9 100.0 
17. 41.5 45.5 1.5 11.5 100.0 
Avera~ 49.7 33.3 10.6 6.4 100.0 
So~: College Treasurers' Reports For T he Year Ended 
June 30, 1931. 
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IV. The College Investment u\ttitud.e and Trend, 1936-1940 
A. Comparison of the Reports of the Colleges Included in 
This Study --1936 Re-oorts Contrasted With Prior Years. 
The fiscal year 1935-1936 was a year of depression. 
Business had certainly shown some signs of recovery by that 
time, but the economy was an uncertain one, and the t .roubled 
nature of the times was clearly expressed in the ~ reasurers' 
reports for that year which were analyzed in this study. In 
comparing t .he reports t .he report.s of fiscal 1936 w:it.h fiscal 
1931, one instantly notices a startling difference. The 
yield, referred. to as "Average Return u in t .he tables, shows 
a drop in the average yield for the colleges under study of 
almost one per cent. The average yield for six colleges 
for 1931 was 4.88 per cent, while the average yield for these 
same colleges--plus one addittonal college which earned a 
much higher than average yield--for 1936 was 3.89 per cent.# 
This one comparison, perhaps, shows with considerable clar-
ity what had happened to endowment- funds as a source of in-
come for the colleges. This factor also serves to illus-
trate why there was a "cha:nging emphasis in college endow-
ment fund investments. 
In chapter III it was noted that the colleges were 
faced with less attractive bond issues, that lucrative bonds 
were being replaced with less attractive offerings and so on. 
This trend, which was in the offing in 1931, ha.d reached 
#See Tables IV and VII. 
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stampede proportions by 1936 and was, of course, the major 
reason for the comparatively poor yields indicated for that 
year in Table VII. 
A comparison of T ables IV and VII sjows that some 
colleges showed quite sharp declines in yield, while others 
managed to hold the drop in yiel.d to more moderate decreases. 
One college which had only a slight. yield loss showed a con-
siderable increase in its common stock holdings--up from 
less than one per cent of total holdings to over 18 per cent. 
1At the same time, this college (number one on the list) cut 
its holdings of bonds and real estate proportionately. 
Another college (number two on the list) sho'l'Jed a h e Rvy 
loss i n y i eld ra t e from 5.3 per cent to 3.7 per cent.. This 
colle ge attempted to swim against the tide an increased its 
b ond holdin g s fro m s ome 45 per cent to over 64 per cent of 
its tote.l portfolio. Still another college (number 17) de-
creased its bond portfolio only slightly in t .his period, 
dropping from 80 per cent t .o 72 per cent of the total. It 
reduced its proportions of common stocks and real estate, 
but markedly increased. it.s holdings o.f Preferred stocks .. 
The college was appa.rently reluctant to part w-ith conserva-
tive ideas of college finance, and held t .enaciously to the 
"blue chips n--hig.h-grade bonds and preferreds. Its top-
heavy bond portfolio offered a fine income yield in 1931, 
but was obviously not keyed t .o the changing picture of 1936. 
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On the whole, it would seem that those colleges who per-
sisted wi t.h bonds did not fare as well, as f e.r as income 
was concerned, as did the less traditional institutions. 
In this five -year period, most of the colleges 
managed to increase the book values of their endowment 
funds; although in most cases the increase was slight. A 
contrast. of Table V and Table VIII does not bring out any 
tremendous increases during the major depression period. 
An analysis of Table IX brings into focus some 
of the changes in sources of income which were taking place 
in the thirties. Table I X merely confirms the s~spicions 
of the reader; namely, that endowmen~ fund income, with its 
shrunken yield, had dropped somewhat in importance with re-
gard to t ot.al income. The drop is not more pronounced be-
cause of curtailed . college budgets. 1936 was a year in 
which colleges cut every corner possible in d.ealing with 
finances. Therefore, even the shr~nken endowment income 
looms somewhat larger ~han one would expect.. AS expected, 
the per cent of total income from gifts and grants declined 
from 1931 to 1936; while that portion of income derived 
from the student body increased percentage -wise during the 
period. 
College number one, singled out previously for 
maintaining its yield through this period, was the only 
one to show endowment fund income as a 'greater source of 
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income percentage-wis,e in 1936 than in 1931. Anot.her col-
lege, number 17, mentioned for its sharp decline in yield, 
had a percent a ge drop from 42 per cent of all income in 
1931 to 28 per cent of all income in 1936 from its in-
vested endowment funds .• 
The college treasurers were vitally concerned 
during this trying time with the problem of suitable endow-
ment fund investments consistent with needed income. A few 
comments from financial reports of 1936 follow. One college 
cited as main objectives: 
1) The gradual acquisition, without sacrifice 
sales t .o provide needed funds, United States Government 
Bonds to the extent of 15 per cent of total investments. 
2) The avoidance of having an unduly large per-
centage of it.s holdings in eny particular class or group of 
investments. 
3) Gradual improvement of the qualit.y of indi-
vidual investments of all kinds, by replacing those not 
measuring up to the investment standard with more desirable 
se cur it i e s • ·!!-
The same college stated a familiar complatnt of 
1936 in its report when it. declared that in the past few 
years the finance committee had to call attention t .o the 
fact that the yield on the portfolio as a whole was con-
~:- 40, p. 1. 
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stantly declining. The committee also stated that during 
the past t.wel ve months bonds were constantly called or re-
funded, and in most cases replaced with a similar bond of 
lower yield. The college found that it was more and more 
difficult t .o secure a yield on t.he type of securities that 
it felt should be :tn i ~s port.f ollo --that is, bonds to a 
large extent--commensurate with prior yields. The commit-
tee hastened to add that it would not sacrifice the quality 
of its investments for higher income. ~:-
Another colle ge raised the same cry about yield 
and suitable securities for investment when it stated that 
the continued process of g iving up securities of hi gh return 
tha t are called and buying new ones offering a low return was 
gr ad ualLy forcing it into a diffic ult situation. Th e college 
maintaine d t hat , since about half of its i nco me was derived 
fro m e nd owmen t, unl es s y ields ceased to decline, the college 
would be forced to curtail its operations. ~~{~ 
One college which clearly saw the handwriting on 
the wall with respect to yields and what was then fe.st be-
coming an unattractive security --the corporate bond--
wanted to be sure of its footing before joining the swin g 
toward investment in equities. In 1936, its board of trus~es 
filed a petition seeking judicial determination of its power 
->:· 40, p. 5. 
~H:· 45, P· 12. 
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to invest the university 's endowment funds in shares of stock 
in corp orations. The purpose of the suit was to remove any 
d oubt concerning the auth ority of the trustees to invest in 
stock , if they decided to do so in order to secure greater 
diversification--and yield. The university treasurer had to 
add that-, in the light of the attention attracted throughout 
the country to the suit, that it. was not true, as rumored, 
that t.he colle ge plan ned to invest a considera ble portion of 
the university's endowment in stocks. ~<-
The above were typical of the op inions expressed 
in comments accompanying the financ i al re ports of 1935-36. 
It was indeed, jud ging from the reports studied in this sur-
vey, a trying andl nerve-racking job--that of try ing to in-
vest college endowment funds. 
B . A Comoarison of the Results of This Study With the Re-
Sults of Other Studies Covering a ComEarable Time Period. 
Yield fi gures obtained in a survey by S cudder, 
Stevens and Cl ark are shown in T able XXVI. The average 
y ield for t.he i nstitutions covered in this survey was 4.24 
per cent for 193 6, a somewhat hi g_her figure than t .hat ob-
tained from the colle ge reports s t udied and the y ield 
f igures as shown in T able VII. The yield 1 s not appre-
ciably high er, but is perhaps somewhat more indicative of 
college endowment funds as a whole than the s maller study 
analyzed in this paper . It should be borne in mind that 
-X- 69 , p . 71 . 
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the. Scudder, Stevens survey covered many more colleges than 
are shown in Table·VII, and that it also covered the very 
small as well as the very large endowments. Table XXVI 
shows one college which had the enviable yield or 6.54 per 
cent, while another college could earn but 2.00 per cent. 
The American Council on Educ8tion Studies, in its 
exhaustive study of the endowment funds of 45 institutions, 
shows in Table XX an average return or 4. 36 per cent for 
fiscal 1936, a rate of return slightly hi gher than either 
this study or t.he Scudder, Stevens and. Clark study showed. 
Table XXI, compared with Table VII for 193 6, shovvs that the 
39 colleges studied held an average of 56.3 per cent of 
their endowment fund. in bonds, while the st.udy of ten col-
leges in Table VII shows. an average of 62.9 per cent in-
vested in bonds. The two tables show comparable percent-
ages of investment in common stocks, while Table VII shows 
a somewhat higher proportion of invest.ment in preferred 
stocks. This preference for bonds and preferreds by the ten 
colleges goes a long way in explaining why they had an aver-
age yield of e.lmost .05 per cent less than the colleges 
studied by the American Council. When Table VII is con-
trast.ed with Table XXII, it is revealed that the ten col-
leges had some 13 per cent more of their total endowment 
tied up in bonds than did the colleges st.udied by the Ameri-
can CoQncil in Table XXII. 
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However, the colleges studied in Table IX were 
considerably more dependent upon endowment funds as a source 
of income than were the colleges studied by S cudder, Stevens 
and Clark as re ported in Table XXVII. ~n average of 46.9 
per cent for t.he former and 32 per cent for the latter shows 
the degree of cont.re.st.. 
C. Other Material Pertainigs to the Period 1936-1940 
The story of one of the more successful of the en-
dowment. funds, and the nat.ion's largest--Harvard University's 
Endowment Fund--for the period up to 1941 was told in an ex-
cellent article by Lucile Tomlinson. She found that Harvard's 
income experience during t .he decade o.f t .he 1930's was prob-
ably more satisfactory than that of t.he majority of American 
endowment funds . In no year did the yield drop below 4 per 
cent. # The yield for 1940, the latest year under study here, 
was 4. 32 per cent. Tomlinson points out that t .he Carnegie 
Corporation, of .similar size, received a yield of only 2.95 
per cent for fiscal 1940. Harvard's yield fluctuated from 
a. high of some 6.27 per cent in 1929-30 to a low o.f 4.23 per 
cent in 1938-39, be.sed on book value. Risks had to be taken 
in the achievement, of those income figures during a period 
of· 3 per cent returns or lower· on high-grade bonds. Harvard, 
however, minimized its risks by a program of broad diversi-
fication not only among industries; but also as between 
# Contrast this with the figures. of Table VII. 
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bonds, preferred and common st,ocks; among issues of varying 
qual.ities; and in the bond portfolio among di.ffering maturities. 
During this. troublesome decade, Harvard he·ld it-s 
bond portfol.io at a fairly st,eady 50 per cent of its tot.al 
fund;· it jumped its common stock ho~dings some 50 per cent 
since 1930, until they accounted for one-third of it.s port-
f 'olio e:t. June 30, 194.0. Of all t ,he common stocks held, 
t -hose of the insurance companies showed the great est in-
crease in the decade • ~~ 
Reference should also be made to a st,udy made at. 
the close of the period under study which analyz-ed the in-
vestment in common st,ocks of 12 of the nation's leading uni-
varsities. This study, shown in Table XXVIII, found an 
average of 31. 4. per cent of total endowment. funds of the 12 
colleges invested in equities.~~:.<- The present study shows, 
in Table VII, at June 30, 1936, an average of 15.7 per cent 
invest.ed in common st.ocks, and at June 30, 1941., following 
the survey mentioned above, a.n average o.f 25.8 per cent in-
vested in equit.ies, as shown in Table X. Some of the nation's 
largest colleges were apparently the leaders in the swing t.o 
common st.ocks which, while pronounced r ·rom 1936.-1941, did not 
reach the proportions of investment in equities that t.he 
major colleges. showed .. 
1~ 12, p. 18. 
~Hf 1.0, p. 319. 
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In one study of 22 colleges, the following maJor 
fields of investment were found for the year 1936. Per cents 
are of total endowment funds. 
Industrials 
Utilities 
Railroads 
Real Estate 
Mortgages 
Government 
Financial (bank, 
investment trust 
etc.) 
Ins tit u t tonal 
Properties 
Insurance 
Miscellaneous 
Tot.al 
28. 057~ 
26.14 
17.69 
8.80 
6.03 
4.93 
2.14 
1.02 
0.85 
4 .• 35 
100. OO% -~:-
From the above information it is apparent that the 
colleges in the survey undertaken in 1936 w·ere aware of the 
need for divers.ificat.ion. It is interesting to na.t,e the 
rather lowly position held by Government securit.ies, a 
grouping that was to become one of the most important of all 
in the 4.0' s. The railroads, f ·crme.r favorites, no longer 
held top spot. in the lete 30's as they did in prior years. 
-~~- 1 , p • 51 . 
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Table VII 
Percentage Distribution of Investments By Type For Ten Colleges 
(Based on Book Value2_ 
At June 30 1 1936 1 and Average Yields For The Year Ending June 30, 1936 
f.ollege 
Number 
1. 
2. 
4. 
7. 
9. 
10. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Average 
Cash and 
Short Term 
2.4fo 
0.2 
8.7 
1.9 
0.8 
3.4 
1.7 
Bonds 
66.7 70 
64 .• 5 
86.9 
35.2 
54.6 
4.8. 3 
68.6 
54.6 
77.0 
71.7 
62.9 
St.ocks 
Preferred Common 
1. 6/o 
11.7 
3.6 
4.2 
28.8 
5.1 
6 .• 6 
28 .. 8 
13.7 
17 •. 3 
10.1 
18 •. 3fo 
14.4 
0.1 
3 4.5 
7.4 
44 ... 4 
2.3 
7.4 
2.1 
7.6 
15.7 
(1) Information not obtainable from reports received. 
Real 
Estat.e 
ll.Ofo 
9.2 
0.7 
26.1 
9.2 
2.2 
20.6 
9.2 
6.4 
9.6 
Total 
100.0% 
100.0 
1 00.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Source: College Treasurers' Reports for the year ended June 30, 1936. 
Average 
Return 
4.20% 
3.70 
4. 61 
3.44 
(1) 
(1) 
3.88 
(l) 
4.06 
3.34 
3.89 
~ 
~ 
Table VIII 
Book Value of Eight College Endowment Funds 
at June 30, 1936 
Colle ge Nu mDer 
2. 
4 . 
7. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
T ot a l Endowment F und 
:1~10 ' 0 77 ' 637 
8,041,601 
16,881,921 
17' 239,839 
31, 27 3 , 575 
8,356,851 
22 ,505,394 
9,855,7 32 
Source: College Treasurers' Reports for the 
year ended June 30, 1936. 
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Colle~ 
Numbe.r 
1. 
2. 
4. 
7. 
9. 
14. 
16. 
17. 
Avera~ 
Table IX 
Chief Sources of Income For Eight Colle~ 
For The Year Ending ,June 30, 193§. 
~?iE_ressed As Per Cents of Total Income 
From 
Endowments 
76.1% 
50.2 
48.8 
34.1 
38.8 
38.8 
60.9 
27.9 
46.9 
From 
Student.s 
32.7 
46..8 
49.5 
26.6 
50.5 
23.6 
55.3 
36.4 
From Gifts 
And Grants 
~3.3fc: 
5.5 
2.1 
11.3 
11.3 
7.7 
2.7 
1.6. 
6.9 
4.7% 
11.6 
2.3 
5.1 
23.3 
3.1 
12.8 
15.2 
9.8 
Source: College Treasurers Reports for the year ended 
June 30, 1936. 
100.0% 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
48. 
v. The College Investment. IAt .titude and Trend, ~941-1945 
·L Comparison of the Reports of The Colleges Includ.ed in 
This Study --1941 Reports Cont.ra:st.ed Wlth Prior Years 
College Treasurers were, on the whole, a happier· 
lot as they submitted their financial reports for fi sca.l 
1941 than they were at any time in t.he prior decade. .An 
analysis of the samplings taken at June 30, 1941, compared 
with comparable figures for ~936 shows the following major 
improvements. 
1) The most import.ant improvement, from the point 
of view of th.e colleges was the upturn in yiel.d. experienced 
by all but t .he most conservative o.f colleges. The average 
yield for t.he colleges studied. had climbed to around 4.0 per 
cent as compared wit.h an average yield of 3.9 per cent. re-
ported for 1936. A contrast of Tables VII and X shows t .hat. 
s.ome of the reasons for the difference were found in ~he 
changing emphasis placed on t .ypes of investment. Col~ege 
number 7, for example, shows an increase in yield from some 
3 .. 4 per cent t .o. 4 .. 0 per cent--mainly as t.he result of mark-
edly cutting tt.s per cent of investment in bonds and in-
creasing it.s per cent, investment in equit..ies. College num-
ber 17 dropped in t .he five -year span from a . 7 2 per cent in-
vestment. in bonds to a 59 per cent investment., increased its 
stock holding from 25 per cent to 39 per cent and its yield 
from 3.3 to 4 .. 0 per cent.. On t .he other hand, conservative 
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mana gement and faith in bonds as t .he basic element in college 
investments led many another college to show yield declines. 
Colle ge number l kept its investment in bonds over 60 per 
cent of the t .otal and suffered a yield decline from 4. 2 per 
cent. to 3.8 per cent. College number 4 increa sed it.s bond 
holdi n g s to s.ome 90 per cent of the total, and received a 
y ield decline from 4.6 to 4.2 per cent. T here were undoubte dl y 
many other f a ctors present. that played a part in the yield 
story other than the simple swit.ch from bonds to equities. 
Factors such as the choice of investments within any given 
category are of prime importance, but it is merely pointed 
out that, by and large, the colleges that invested in equities 
were not s.orry that t .h ey had done so. 
2) All of the colleges studied, except number 14 
and 15, were able to report gains in ~he total book values of 
endowment . funds. Some of t .he increases were very large, oth-
ers. more moderate, but. they generally reflected a rather 
healthy condi~ion. 
3) Another factor wa s the increase in the ~otal 
income received from student fees, and a corresponding de-
cline in the per cent of t .otal income obtained from the en-
dowment funds. Many factors were at work in this change; 
the chief factor probably wa s the incre a sed ability of the 
student body to pay more of the cost of its education. En-
dowment funds declined in importance percentage-wise as a 
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source of colle ge revenue for several rea sons. In addition 
to the rea son cited above, the colle ge endowment funds, al-
though increasing , were not increa sing at as rapid a rate as 
ne cessary to maint ain their cont-ribution to income at e.ny -
t h ing l ike the 1936 rate . Co l l e ge bud gets for 1 941 we re sub-
stantiall y h igher than fo r the le an years of t .he 30' s, and a 
ce r ta in amount of infl ati on h ad depres se d t he d ol lar f rom i t s 
1 93 6 p ur chas ing power. These factors, coupled with only a 
moderate increase in college endowment fund yields, served 
to emphasize other sources of income. Needless to say , the 
income statements for 1941 served t .o increase t .he pressure 
on endowment fund officials to improve their yields even more. 
Once a gain the conflict within the colleges over 
the relative merits of bonds and stocks as college investments 
continued. Many college treasurers commented on the dispute 
in their reports, some at considerable length, apparently to 
justify a particular position which the college had taken. 
One typical report ha.d t .he following comments about the situ-
at ion: 
Considerable di fference of opin-
ion exists with respect to the relative 
merits of common stocks as endowment fund 
investments. Leading colleges have common 
stock holdings ranging from 15 per cent 
upwards to 40 per cent of their total en-
dowment.; and inspired chiefly by the need 
for enlarged income return, the recent 
trend h as been toward the higher figure. 
Your committee be l ieves that our position 
is well-balanced and that our present. 
holdings of about 20 per cent of the fund 
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in common stoc.ks are sufficient to enable 
us to benefit materially during any period 
of rising equity values withou~ involving 
excessive risk a.s a result of market de-
preciation or loss of i .ncome under less 
favorable conditions.* 
It might be noted that the above college had a 
yield for 1941 slightly below the average for the colleges 
studied. It. maintained a~ fairly conservative position at 
that t .ime, and its basic faith in bonds had not been shat-
tered. Note wa.s also taken of changing conditions by an-
other college which came t .o. a slightly different conclusion 
as to where its funds should be invested. 
The committee readjusted t .he 
securities program in such a way as gen-
erally t ,o conform to the objective of 
having the investment, in bonds and stocks 
distributed as follows: 
Bonds of 
Bonds of 
Dividend 
Dividend 
Prime Qual 1 t .. y 
Int.ermediat,e Quality 
P'aying Preferred Stocks 
Paying Common Stocks 
407~ 
201~ 
10?'~ 
30% 
The major difference proposed at that. t .ime in this 
college report was one of emphas.is within the portfolio. The 
officials felt that any risks they took should be in the fi.eld 
of the equities, and consequently the bulk of the allocation 
for. bonds was assigned t ,o those of high quality. The t.wo re-
ports mentioned above were from colleges preferring to remain 
as conservative as possible, and yet trying to get in on at 
least a little of the profits of any bull market. 
-~ ;. 41, p. 5. 
-:H:- 70, p. 106. 
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B. A Comparison of The Result-s of This Study \'V i th The Re-
S ul ts of Other Studies Covering a Comparable Time Period 
Anot.her comparison with the results of the American 
Council on Education S tudies reve a ls that 4.43 per cent was 
the average yield for the colleges studied by t.he American 
Council and a·s found in Tabl.e XX. This compares vvfth approx-
imately 4.0 per cent in t.he present study, and once e.gain t .he 
Council's. figures reveal a somewha.t . higher yiel.d than do the 
figures for the colleges studied now.. However, the t.welve 
colleges studied at June 30, 1941, showed an average of over 
50 per cent. invested in bond.s as compared to the ~~merican 
Council's 41 per cent. at. the same d.ate as shown on Table XXI. 
Common stock compar t sons reveal that., on the average, Ameri-
can Council colle ges had 5.0 per cent. more inve st.ed in equi-
ties than did the colleges report.ed in Table X. lA comparison 
with Table XXII, where the size of the college endowment fund 
is somewhat- more comparable t .o t.hat. represented in this study, 
reveals that the discrepancy between it.s bond and st.,ock fig-
ures and those of Table X is not quite as large. Needless to 
say, other factors are present besides those of bond and 
stock proportions, but t.heir constant. recurrence in t .his 
study l .ea.ds one to the conclusion that. they are perhaps the 
most. significant. of t .he factors present in the yield story. 
Reference. should also be made to Table XXIII which 
summarizes bond and stock percentages of some 120 colleges. 
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These fi gures are fairly close to those of T able X, and the 
only large difference occurs in the proportion of bonds; 
Table X reveals a 50 per cent investment in bonds exceeding 
that. shown in Tabl.e XXIII by some 14 per cent. .lA bree:kd.own 
of the types of investment of 22 large institutions for the 
p eriod of 1938-1943# provides an int.eresting comparison with 
Table X, and once again the same differences with respect to 
bonds and equities are revealed. 
C. Other Material Perte.ining to The Period 1941-1945 
.f side from the conttnuing int.erest. in equit.ies as 
investment possibilities, perhaps the most, s.triking change 
of this period was in the colleges' att,itudes t .owards Gov-
ernment Bonds. In examining portfolios of the 1930's, one 
would find very few colleges which listed Governments as a 
separ a1;se cat.e gory , or· who, for t.hat. matt.er, even had any of 
this type of investment. listed among t.heir security holdings. 
This situation was destined to change in the 1940's for sev-
eral rea.sons. Perhaps the most. important of t .hese reasons 
was the lack of availability of O-ther sui table investments 
for the colleges. Anot.her major reason was t .he force of 
patriot.ism, and st,ill a third reason was the factor of safety 
which Governments provided. The switch to Governments was 
not an altogether happy one, because yields were by no means 
what t.he colleges would have liked them t .o have been. 
# See Tabl.e XXIV. 
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For purpos.es of comparison, and t.o high~ight. this 
change, the Tables for ~94~ and cu.cceeding years have been 
arrange d so a-s t .o give emphasis t.o the chan ge in attitude 
toward the Governments.. The averag e i nvestment percentage-
wise for t.he col~eges studied in 1941 shows some 9 per cent. 
of all funds tied up in U. S . Securit.i es. # It should be 
noted that many colleges had much higher proportions in Gov-
ernments, while others still kept relatively free of them. 
Needless to se.y , all had succumbed to the inevitable by ~he 
close of World War II. By way of comparison, Smith College, 
not inc~uded in this study, had Slightly aver one -half of 
it. s bond portfolio in Governments by June 30, 1942, a . t .otal 
for Treasuries of some 32 per cent. a.f t.he ent.ire fund • .;:-
Ji. stu dy of the Harvard University portfolio as of 
June 30, 1944, l .at.er in the war and in our period under 
study here, did no.t disc~ose any really pronounced sw:ing 
to b onds o.f the Feder a~ Government on Harvard's part, how-
ever. T he Harvard Tre a sury holdings at t.,hat t..ime constituted 
some 18 per cent. of its ent.ire portfo~io at book values, and 
some 17 per cent, at. market v a lues. -~Hr. 
!Among ot.her outside sources reporting on the war 
period, perhaps the work of the American Council on Educat.ion 
Studies was of the most importance. The Council found the 
# See Table X. 
1(- 13' p. l8. 
·::-><- 27, p. 83. 
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following situation with respect tOl t.he period under study: 
The general trend is toward a 
decrease in holdings of bonds and mort--
gages, and increases in preferred st. ocks, 
co mm on stocks, and real estate. In util-
ity hold.ings, bonds hav-e decreased, while 
stocks have increased. In industrials, 
bonds have decreased, preferred stocks 
have increased, while co mmon stocks have 
decreased or remained fairly constant. 
Institutions are still liquidating rail 
bond s, but t .here has been an upward trend 
in rail common st..ocks. This may be due 
to the receipt of new issues of st.ocks in 
reorganization pr ocedures or to the pur-
chase and class if i cation of def ault.ed 
bonds as common stock. * 
This sit.uation as fo.und by the American Council corresponds 
fairl.y well t.o the result,s as shown by t .he present study for 
the period under study. The Council also had the following 
co mments about diversification at, t.hat t .tme: 
There seems t.o be a growing 
feeling among college invest,ment officers. 
that a policy of broad, general d.i verst-
fication, based upon a very careful study 
of ind ividU€1.1 issues , is the be st. one 
that can b e follo wed at t is ~ime. Prac-
tically al l inst itutions whi cb find them-
selve s in an extreme position a re adjust-
ing their programs to bring about a more 
diversified list. There are several im-
portant institutions which: believe that 
high-grade bonds remain t.he only sound 
investment.s for endowment, purposes.~<-><' 
It. is apparent from the a.b o·ve that the colleges as a whole 
were fulLy aware of the complexit.y of the problems facing 
them a.nd were attempting on the whole t .o adjust t.heir port.-
·)~- 4 I p • 4 • 
-:Hi- 4, p. 6. 
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folios to take the best, possible adva.ntage of the situation 
at that time. It is int-eresting to. note in reading the re-
ports of the colleges that replied to the -~1\:merice.n Council's 
requests fo:r information that many of them still held an 
ost.ri tch -type view t.oward any diversification in types of 
investment or even in quality of investment wttohin the cho-
sen media. Many college treasurers were apparently deter-
mined to follow policies giving portfolio strength rather 
t .han yiel.d and watt. for the day when yield on high-grade · 
would once again reach the happy heights of the twent,ies. 
Since the reports cited in this chapt.er were pre-
pared prior t .o the United States' entry int.o World War II, 
they do not reflect the extent of the changes forced u.pon 
college treasurers by the war. It has been noted in this 
chapter that many changes were mad.e, notably· in the fiel.d 
of u. s. Government Bonds, and t .he two ex8rmple s cited above 
tend to show t .he college reaction t..o some degree. 
The period from 1941 t .o 1945 was marked on t.he 
whole by a continuat.ion of the trend toward. t.-he purchase of 
common stocks, the general improvement of bond holdings 
wherever possible, and the acquisition of previously un-
heard of amount.s invested in the securities of the federal 
government. The followin g chapt.er will show the effects of 
the war on college finances and an certain aspects of the in-
vestment picture. 
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College 
Number 
---
1. 
2. 
4. 
7. 
9. 
10. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
:Avera~ 
T able X 
Percentage Di stri but ion of Investments By Type For Twelve Colle~§_ 
LBased on Book Valu~ 
At Ju!le 30, 1941.1-and .Average Yields For The Y~ Ending June 30, 1941 
Cash and Bonds Stocks Real T.ote.l .Average 
Short Term u.s. Other Preferre~--cDmmon Estate Return 
3.1% ll.8fo 50.3% 3.-5% 25.6% 5. 7% 100.0~ 3. 777~ 
-· 
8.2 48.3 15.0 21.4 7.1 100.0 3.71 
0 .2 0 .5 89.1 5.9 4.3 
-
1 00.0 4.18 
-
3 .. 8 26.7 8.3 34.9 26.3 100.0 4.00 
- -
46.8 12.2 37.9 3 .. 1 100.0 (l) 
4.7 21.3 16.2 4.6 43.5 9.7 100.0 (l) 
4.2 7.4 24.9 22.8 13.8 27 .o 100.0 4.89 
5.7 25.4 25.8 9.2 25.8 8.1 100.0 3.17 
2.8 11.1 33.2 9 . 7 20.3 22.9 100 .0 4.00 
-
4.2 40.5 25.8 23.6 7.9 1 00.0 (1) 
0.1 
-
53.6 6 •. 9 31.1 8.3 100.0 4 .07 
2. 2 8.3 50.3 10.9 28.2 0.1 1 00.0 4.00 
2.0 8. 8 41.8 ll. 2 25. 8 10.4 100.0 3.98 
(1) Information not obtainable from reports received. 
So~: College Treasurers' Reports for the year ended June 30, 1941 
(J1 
().) 
. 
Table XI 
Book Value of Ten Colle~Endowment Funds 
At June 30 J~41 
College Number Total E ndowment Fund 
l. $10,408,459 
2. 8,590,458 
4. 18,229,691 
7. 19,526,934 
12. 21, 291,057 
13. 6, 486,375 
14. 29,705,083 
15. 7' 969,109 
16. 25,191,285 
17. 10,790,691 
Sourca : College Treasurers • Reports for the year ended 
June 30, 1941. 
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Colle ge 
Number 
1. 
2. 
4. 
7. 
9. 
1._3. 
14. 
16. 
17. 
.Average 
Sour ce: 
---
Table XII 
Chief Sources of Income For Nine Colleges 
For The Year Ending_June 30, 1941 
Ex pressed ..A s Per Cents of Total Income 
From From 
Endowments stlident s 
59.4 5.5 
49.9 37.5 
33.9 54.6 
36.5 50.2 
37.2 24.3 
8.1 83.5 
4 2.1 34.2 
53 . 8 24 .1 
18.2 76.4 
37. 9 43.7 
From Gifts 
.And Grants 
23.9 
4.6 
5. 5 
8.2 
11.1 
0 .5 
8.2 
8.2 
1. 4 
7.9 
11.2 1 00 .0 
8 •. 0 100 .0 
1.0 100.0 
5.1 100.0 
27.4 1 00 .0 
7. 9 100 .0 
15. 5 100 .0 
13. 9 1 00 .0 
4 . 0 100.0 
10.5 100 . 0 
College T reasu.rers' Reports for the year ended 
June 30, 1941. 
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VI. The Col lege Investment Attitude and Trend, 1946-1950 
A. Comparison of the Reoorts of the Colleges Included in 
This Study --1946 Reports Contrasted ~71th Prior Yea-rs. 
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950, trustees 
of college endowment funds were able t.o report more ho pefully 
to those interested in the college's welfRre than at any other 
time during the past several years. The reason for the optimism 
was apparent.. World War II had officially ended at the start 
of fiscal 1946; the G.I. Bill had been passed and the effect 
of it was due to be felt in the i mmediate future. This meant 
full clas srooms and a r e turn to more normal conditions to most. 
college campuses. The S econd ~ orld War had indeed presented 
the independent. college with a most serious crisis. Many of 
the colleges had been able to accommodate service units; they 
had survived fairly well. Others had not been so fortunate, 
and for them V-J Day was most certai nly an important day. 
The colleges .of the nation had much t .o rejoice about. in the 
conclusion of the war. .And yet, not every aspect of college 
life was entirely on t .he plane at which official l"o would have 
liked to have had it. One field in particular was the field 
of endowments .and their investment. 
For V -J Day had also brought into t.he open the 
smoldering question of how best. to invest. the colleges' funds. 
During t ,he war the colleges had been forced to adopt a short.-
term program, one which in the main called for increased and 
increasing investments in the government.' s se curi ties at a 
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fairly moderate rat-e of return, but with a safety factor that. 
had considerable influence on investment officials. 
Just how did the colleges stand at the end of fis-
cal 1946? In the prime of y ield, the colleges were not as 
badly off as me.ny had feared. Ivl any officials felt that the 
large investments in Governments would tend to shrink yields 
considerably, especially in relation to old-time bond yields. 
;nother !"actor was, they felt, also present; this was the 
general expectation that the war and the high tax rates 
would pare corporate dividends to a very low level. .A glance 
at Table XIII reveals that the situation could have been a 
lot worse at the end of 1946. On the average, the college~ 
stud.i~~had shown a~ld almost identical with that shown 
for the colleges studied at. 1941 as shown on Table X . 1'here 
were a few colleges that had violent changes in yield, but 
few we re able to improve the yield rates to any great extent. 
College number 17, however, was able to up its yield rate 
fro m 4.0 p er cent in 1941 to some 4.9per cent in 1946. A 
closer analysis of the securities held by that college re-
veals tha.t it held only 17 per cent of it-s t.ot.al portfolio 
in Governments, while the average for all colleges was some 
30.5 per cent. In e.ddition, it held less bonds percentage-
wise than the avere.ge, double the average per cent of pre -
ferred stock s, and considerably more than t h e average for 
co mm on stocks. 
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While "the case cited above wa.s certainly unorthodox 
as far as the average college was concerned, it a pparently 
paid off in the important yield column, for 1946 at any rate. 
However, most of the colleges preferred the somewbat less-
risky and less-d.ramatic field of Governments . While 1 946 
was not the peak y·ear for the colleges as far a s the Govern-
ments were concerned, there were several college.s that held 
proportions of U. S . Bonds in the portfo.lios t.o the extent 
of more than 40 per cent of all hol.ding s.. In t .his field, the 
average holding of U. S . Government Bonds increased. from some 
9. 0 per cent in 1941 to almost. 31 per cent. of t .he total in 1946. 
,At the same time, the category for bonds other than U. S . Gov-
ernments showed a decline from 42 per cent in 1.941 t.o 21 per 
cent in 1946, or almost a 50 per cent reduction from the 1941 
fi g ure. -As discussed above , this was the result. of several 
factors, chief among them being the almost complete scarcity 
of suitable bond investments outside of those offered by the 
Government. Investment.s in stocks, both preferred.s and com-
mons, held at about t.he same per cent., while t .he investment 
in real estate and mortgages showed a substantial decline. 
comparison of the book values of t .otal endowment 
funds at 1941 and 1946 shows a healthy upturn in the dollar 
value of t .he funds. Every college for which figures were 
availab le showed an increase in the valuation of the endow-
ment funds, and several showed increases in the millions of 
6:3. 
dollars. The war years, then, had not been too unkind to the 
colleges as far as increased endowment was concerned. 
Perhe.ps it sh ould be noted, however, that st.ock 
prices had been in a bull market from the low point of 1942--
lowest Dow-Jones Industrial Average since 1934--th rough the 
first half of 194 6, reaching a peak of 212. 50 on May 29, 194 6. 
This meant, even at book v alue, that increased stock prices 
were reflected in the higher colle ge endowment. fund totals. 
ShortLy after the date used in determining portfolio va.lues 
in Tab le XIV, the market broke, and t.he Dow-Jones Industrial 
Average fell t .o 163.12 on October 9, 1946. The drop in mar-
ket. values for st.ocks on t .he whole should be considered in 
evaluating the period from 1946-1950. F'or it was not until 
1950 t.hat- stocks again reached t..he levels registered in the 
boom tha t c a rried through the early fall of 1946. 
It was not.ed in Chapter V that the relative impor-
tance of endowment fund income was declining at a fairly 
rapid rate in the colleges under study. Th e trend continued 
on, and, as revealed in Table XV, income from endowment. funds 
accounted for only 32 per cent of total income, a decline 
from 1941 of almost, 6 per cent. of t .otal income. Student in-
come aLso declined slight.ly in importance in the five-year 
period. Gifts increased in imp ortance as a revenue source, 
and "other'~ --including U. S . Government contracts., which ha.d 
become a major source of income for. ·several of the colleges--
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showed a 50 per cent increase over the figure reported for 
1941. The fa:ct.ors which were imp ortant in the decline in im-
portance of the endowment fund as a source of income, con-
tinued to operate in 1946. In addition to those previously 
mentioned in prior chapters, a new factor appeared. This 
was the element of inflation. College costs had increased 
considerably over prior years as a result of hi gher prices, 
salary scales, and so on, despite the existence of Govern-
ment control.s over these fields. So the squeeze was put. an 
college finances, and it. is apparent, that. with a yield almost 
identical to tha~ obtained in 1941., the colleges could no~ 
hope to increase their income from endowments a.ppreciably 
without vastly increased assets in the endowment funds. In-
creases in endowment fund.s were forthcoming but not in the 
extent needed for income purposes, and so the practice of 
giving for immediate use--listed for our purposes as "gifts 
and grants"--was encouraged. 
At the same time, coll~s with any 1:Y~Q.f_f..§lcil i-
ties that coul d be used bv the_B.Q.vernment for rese a rch_Qur,=. 
pose~~ere~~g_er to receive from Uncle Sam's munificence and 
thus avoid staggering_Qefi~its. 
The picture as reported by the colleges under study 
showed the need for as skillful management as possible in the 
endowment fund field, and t .he fact was evident in 1946 that 
if the endowment funds were ever again going t .o be as impor-
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tant to the colleges as they had been in the past, new think-
ing and new appraisals of the entire situation were in order. 
It was also abundantly clear that each security in the port-
folio should be scrutinized as to its worth to the college, 
and that the dead wood would have to be eliminated if the 
endowment fund was foing to function properly. Of course in 
many colleges this was easier said than done, as many endow-
ment funds had stringent provisions attached to them, regard-
ing securities that could be purchased, and also with regard 
to securities received as gifts and which had provisions gov-
erning them re ga rding the sale of the securities. 
College treasurers were facing up to t.he tasks presented 
to them, and it was a pparent, that they reali zed the difficulties 
of their position. One colle ge report contained the following 
co mmentary on the situation at that time. 
The termination of war presented 
serious and conflicting problems to Gov-
ernme~t, to industry, to l ab or, and to o ur 
coll e ge in our efforts o return as quickly 
as possible to normal pe a c e -time living . 
Ivi an~r of t h ese problems re main unsolv ed, and 
full reconversi on of industry ha s been de-
layed many mont.hs beyond p revious expecta-
tions. In such an atmosphere your commit-
tee has considered it imperative to proceed 
with great caution in investing the funds 
under its supervision. The Endowment. Fund 
today is more strongly entrenched with high-
grade fixed income securities than at any 
time during the pas~ fifteen y ears .•.. Over 
76 per cent of t.he market value of our com-
mon stock portfolio is concentrated in pub-
lic utili t.y, bank and insurance, chemical, 
oil, retail t .rade, drug, tobacco, amusement, 
and similar enterprises. Only minor 
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representation ts given at the present. 
time t .c st,eel, au.tomotive, railroad, 
machinery, and other "heavy 11 indu.str ies . 
••• The tendency for yields ~o go lower 
and lower throu.gbout the war ye·ars has 
continued up ~ o the t .ime of this report..-:~-
This college was one which had enjoyed sound finan-
cial management. for a long period of t .ime, and it.s position 
in 1946 was apparent.ly one of caut.ion, holding to the Govern-
ments and other sound se curit ie s and being very ca.ut.ious in 
deal i ng with the 'tt1eavy" indust.ries, which the college felt 
wou.ld h s.ve depressed earnings after the boom of the war.# 
This se.me report goes on to discuss its conservat ive policies 
at greater length as follows: 
In the face of all the disturbed. 
condi ti ens experienced in recent mont.hs, 
the optimism of the investing public has 
lif.ted the Dow Jones average t .o a fifteen-
year high of 212 •••• The fear of further 
inflation i n living costs has been a con-
siderable influence in the sustained strength 
o.f the market.. Additional impet.us has been 
added by ~he unsatisfactory return from bends, 
which has literally forced many millions of 
institut.ional and discret..ionary trust. funds 
into common stocks. The policy of your com-
mittee has always been on the conservative 
side when fixing the percentage of our funds 
to be invested in common stocks; a recent 
comparison of our holdings of this type of 
se curtt ies with t,hose of eight other repre-
sent.ati ve educational institutions discloses 
tha.t . the average percentage of the total 
funds of this group invest.ed in common stocks 
# Of course t-he po st.-war period found them 100 per cent, wrong 
in this pre m i se • 
~:- 42' p. 1. 
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is 37. 2 per cent, whereas in t .he case of 
Bowdoin it is only 23. 8 per cent based on 
book value.~~ 
It is a pparent from the above that the policy of 
that. college was to st i ck to principle and not. be led into 
fields that it felt it should no~ enter. Needless to say, 
its yield figure for 1946 was not ~he highest in the group 
under study, but this college was gearing its investment 
policies in the direction of what. it felt would serve it 
best in ~he long run. .Another college which also tried to 
remain conservative in the si~ua~ion as it was in 1946 summed 
up its posi~ion as follows~ 
It, is st,ill extremely difficult 
to find investment.s o.f de s,irable quali t,y 
which pay a ret.urn t..hat is at. all commen-
surat.e with the Uni versi t.y' s needs. The 
Finance Committee is unwilling t .o buy se-
curities of below-average o..._uality which 
would cause concern. In consequence, a 
further reduction in the income average 
' 
must be faced. At t h e present time, 22 per 
cent of t he portfolio is i n vested in Govern-
ment Bonds , t h e nighest yie l d paid by any 
of them being 2 1 /2 pe r cent. T o a s sist i n 
meet.ing t .he s ituation, as large a portion 
as possible of current and miscellaneous fmds 
is kept invested. 'l~~~ 
B . A Comparison of The Results of This Study With The Re-
sults of Other Studies Covering a Comparable Time Period. 
Comparisons of this period with results of the Ameri-
can Council on Education Studies could not be made because. the 
American Council ceased its work in this field w:tth its infor-
-;~ 42, p. 5. 
-X-3f- 77, p. 7. 
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mation covering the years up t .o and including 1943. An ex-
cellent post -war study was made by t..he ftrm of Scudder, Stevens 
and Clark and has been referred to in prior chapters. The 
broad study undertaken by S cudder, St.evens and Clark showed 
the following average percentages of security holdings--based 
on book value a~ June 30, 1946: 
~~f 6, p. 4. 
High-Grade Securit. ies~ : 
Cash 
U. S. Governments 
Utility Bonds 
Railroad Bonds 
Industrial Bonds 
Foreign Bonds 
Municipals 
Preferred Stocks 
Senior Risk Securities:-
Utility Bonds 
Railroad Bonds 
Industrial Bonds 
Foreign Bonds 
Municipal Bonds 
Utility Preferreds 
Railroad Preferreds 
Industrial Preferreds 
Common Stocks: 
Utility 
Railroads 
Industrial 
Bank and Insurance 
Real .Est at.e Mort.ga.ge s. Etc. :. 
Real E state Mortgages 
Real 'E state E quity 
Miscellaneous 
2.5fo 
27 .o 
3.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
2.0 
4.5 
1 .. 5 
0.5 
3.5 
0.5 
6.0 
4.0 
1.5 
20.0 
5.0 
5.5 
8.0 
o. 5 ~~ 
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The preceding table, which is given in consider-
ably more detail than that done in t.he present study for the 
year 1946 gives a very clear picture of college investment 
policies as ~hey were set forth in 1946. A breakdown along 
similar lines for the colleges studied in the present survey 
accompanies Chapter VII, and at~ention is directed ~o a com-
p ari son of these findings. JA more. meaningful comparison for 
present purposes could be obtained from the following sum-
mary of figures from t.he prior page and those of Table XIII. 
Cash 
U. S . Government s 
Other Bonds 
Preferred Stocks 
Common Stocks 
Real E state 
Table XIII 
1. 57lc: 
30.5 
21. 2 
11.2 
29.4 
6.2 
Compiled From 
Scudder, Stevens 
and Clark 
2.5% 
27 .o 
14.5 
11.0 
30.5 
14.0 
From a glance at the above table, one notices that. 
the only areas of real difference lie in tho.se of "Other 
Bonds" and "ReaT E state". It should be remembered t .hat the 
S cudder, S tevens survey covered some 84 per cent of all col-
lege endowm ents in this country, and with a scrutiny of col-
lege records not permitted t.o the average person. Therefore, 
it would seem that the sampling represented in this study is 
a fairly represent.e.ti ve one of meri can colle ge s as a whole. 
One should bee.r in mind, however, that the above 
figures e.re averages, and not necessarily indicative of e.ny 
colle ge within the group. The followin g statements may 
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high~ight these differences: 
.At . le a st as important a s these 
a.verage fi gure s are "!$he sharp deviations 
from the average shown by many universi-
t .ies and colle ges. Thus one inst.itu.:tion 
hel d 81.5 per cent of its funds in high-· 
grade s enior s.ecuri tiest another 77 per 
cent and another 75 per cen-1$. ~ gain, one 
inst.i~ution held 56 per cent of its endow-
ment. fund in senior r i sk securities, while 
seveTal others held around 35 per cent. 
One inst i tution held 72 per cent of its 
endowment funds in common st.ocks (at book 
value), one held 59 per centt and six held 
a round 51 per cent. Fin ally, one institu-
tion helc.;l 70 p er cent in real estate mort-
gage. s and rec:'l.l est ate, one held 58 per centt 
and five held bet.w:een 39 and 44 per cent. -;r. 
The above findin g s can be summarized in t ,he follow-
ing table: 
Over-All Proport.ions 
( Percentage of E ach Endowment. Fund, 1946) 
High-Grade 
Securit.ies 
Senior Risk 
S e curi t.ie s 
Common Stocks 
Real E state. 
~~ook Value 
Max i-
---mum 
81. 5;1~ 
56 •. 0 
72.0 
70.0 
Mean 
37 .. 0% 
~9.0 
3o·.o 
13.5 
Mini.:. 
mum 
----
0.5 
o.o 
At Market Value 
Maxi-
mum 
80.5fo 
53.0 
82.5 
56.5 
M~ rvt igt-
~-
34.0% 
~8. 5 
35.5 
12.0 
2.07~ 
0.5 
Tab~es XXVI and. XXVII also inc~ude data from the 
S cudder, Stevens and Clark survey. A comparison of the find-
ings of T able XXVI relative to yields shows the following_ 
comparison. Of the colleges st.udied and analyzed in Table XXVI, 
-::· 6, p. 5. 
~( ·) ~- 6 , p • 8 • 
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the mean, or average, yield was 4.01 per cent; Table XIII, 
for thirt.een colleges studied here, shows an avera.ge yield 
of 3. 97 per cent, or very close to t.hat. revealed by the ex-
haustive study ment.ioned previously. Another comparison that 
can be made is in regard to sources of income. The present 
study showed the endowment funds as accou.nt .ing for, on the 
average, some 32.3 per cent of total income. Table XXVII 
shows endowment funds on the average a.s ta.king care of only 
24 per cent. of all college expenses. The difference between 
these two figures may be acco:unt.ed for by one of two reasons: 
1. Table XIII is based on income, while Table XXVII 
is based on expense, and many colleges had situations where in-
come did not cover all expenses, or 
2. The pre sent survey w:as designed t.o cover only 
colleges. wit,h fairly sizable endowment. funds--fund.s which 
were considered as very import ant. to the income of the college. 
Reference should also be directed to an excellent 
study of college endowment fund investments undertaken by 
Barron's, and containi ng certain data about. selected colleges 
up to 1950. This informat.ion appears in Table XXXIII. It 
is int.eresting t .o note, that in this study, for the year 
1950, at the close of the t.ime period covered by this chap-
ter, the average yield for 14 colleges was 4.01 per cent--
based on market value, in general. An exact comparison can-
not be made with 1946 figures based on book value, but it 
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would seem t .a indicate that no really great. improvement. in 
yields h ad been realized by that time. Also of interest from 
this t e.ble a re the average percentages invested in the various 
classes af securities. Averages far bonds reveal that those 
in Barron's st,udy have 45.4 per cent.. in all bonds for 1950 
a s compared with almost 52 per cent. on t ,he average f'or the 
colleges in this s~udy in 1946. This would tend to confirm 
the trend toward equit.ies and also t .o take note of decreased 
holding s of Government.s t .oward the end. of t ,he 1940's. Aver-
ages for pref'erred. stocks for 1950 show same 9.3 per cent. 
invest.ed in t .his category as compared with 11.2 per cent on 
the average in this study far 1946. Barron~ s study shows 
an average of 36.3 per cent invested in common stocks in 
1950 as compared t .o 29.4 per cent as revealed in the present 
study for 1946 .• ~ general comparison of all the figures 
above would tend t ,o confirm the ~rend a .t t .he end of the pe-
riod under st.ud'' 
" 
in this chapt,er, and a. trend which has been 
noted previously in the work; that is, a continued preference 
for common stocks coupled with a continued departure from 
bonds. Other types of inve stment:..s have not. revealed the 
changes t.hat these two ~ypes have shown, and the major activ-
ity through 1950 could be summarized once again as merely· a 
continuance of t .he shift. of college endowment. money into the 
equities. 
C. Other Material Pertaining to The Period 1946-1950 
Other comment,s pertaining t .o t..he time under study 
were to be found in the wrtt.ing s of various financial experts, 
and t y pical of such co mments were the following: 
Many com mittees, rather than permit 
cash to lie idle, invested in United States 
Government Bonds, which offered a low r a te 
of income, but maximum security . As the sit-
u ation became better, t hey t .ended t .o shift 
the holding s t o other fields of investment. 
The fact the.t some Government and 
municipal bonds are tax-free offers no ad-
vantage to ~he colle ge or university , because 
endowm.ent. funds are also t .e.x-free. In nor-
mal times, college and univers i ty invest-
ment com mittees feel that they cannot af-
ford. to, hold these low-yielding securit-ies. 
The general pol i cy, therefore, is to hold 
only the minimum amount of such b ond s dur-
ing normal times and to increase the amount 
during times of uncertainty and distress. -;~ 
The a bove co mments seemed to sum up the a ttitudes. of college 
endowment funds' investment authorities. In other words, the 
u. S . Bonds were used only when ot.her securities were un-
ava ilable, or wh en Ve. l\J.e s were unce r ta i n and t h e p rime con-
s i d e r a tion had t o be safety . 
J. Par ker Hal l of t h e Un iversit y of Chica g o had 
some pe rt i n ent comments t o make conce r n i n g the s it uation in . 
19 4 6 as fo l l ows : 
Th e total book value of all col-
lege end owment fund s is about 1.8 bi l l i on 
d~llars . •.. The colle ges show a much slower 
rate of growth ~han do banks or insurance 
companies, ... In the ten years ending 1946, 
college endowment.s rose about one -third, 
commercial bank assets tripled, and life 
~~· 1, p. 56. 
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company assets doubled ...• The college 
problem, then, is one of how best ~o in-
vest existing funds. 'The relatively 
small accretions from ye a r to year are 
not much c a use for concern. The college 
trend is t .oward increased investment in 
co mmon stocks. -3< 
In the same article quote d above, the author analyzed t.he 
reasons for t.he growing int.erest. in eq.ui ties by the colleges 
and cited the following points: 
l.) Rate of Return: 'The colleges could show about 
5. 5 per cent in 1931 as compe.red with about 4. 5 per cent. av-
era ge yield in 1949. With a d.ecline in yield of almost. 2 per 
cent on high-grade bonds, the colleges had to to something to 
keep the yield loss as low as it was. 
2.) Insta.bili ty of Income Predicted For 'T he Future: 
He felt that end.owment income in the future would not be as 
predictable as in the past. because o.f the swing to equities 
which de p end on profits t .o bring a good yield. This lack of 
a fixe d return on endowment fund income has led several col-
le ges to set up reserve funds to st abili z e the payments t .o 
the college from year t.o year. 
3.) Fluctuations in Market Value: S ince the col-
leges hold for income rather than for capital gain, they can 
afford to disregard fluct .uat ions in market. value t.o a greater 
extent. than can other investors. Many colleges have turned 
t .o formula plans a s a safeguard against. loss of mark et value, 
.. ; ~ 22, p. 25. 
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however. # 
4.) Contribu~ion of Venture Capital: The colleges 
have been doing their share for .Americats future by investing 
in the stock of its companies. 
5.) Protection of Purchasing Power; The colleges 
felt that if inflation continued, investment. in common stocks 
was the best We;y to safeguard their investments • .;~" 
There is little doubt but what there were many fac-
tors at work in the shift. toward common stocks, and perhaps 
the points from Mr. Hall's analysis presented above present 
a fair picture of t .he reasons for the shift. Needless to 
say, in the present study it i s felt that the first reason 
f a r outweighs all of the others in importance. Chapter VII 
will a.ttempt t .o bring the situation up to date and to present 
the outlook for the future. 
# See Chapter VIII. 
-" 22, P• 25. 
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Table XIII 
Percent~Distrib~tion of Investments By '!:.YE.e For Thirteen Colleges 
(Based on Book Value) 
At June 30J946, and .Average Yields For The Year EndiniL_June 30, 1946 
Colle@. 
Number 
1. 
2. 
4. 
6. 
'7. 
9. 
10. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Avera~ 
Cash and 
Short Term 
l .. 6fo 
(1) 
0.2 
7.3 
1.7 
6.2 
2.2 
1.5 
Bonds 
!L.~ Other 
49 .. 4~0 
27.3 
13.2 
34.5 
10.9 
30.8 
41.5 
41.6 
43.4 
43.8 
22.0 
22.1. 
17.0 
30.5 
17.3% 
29.1 
59 .3 
7.0 
29.1 
23.1 
7.3 
15.0 
12.4 
12.2 
16.3 
32.1 
15.0 
21.2 
Stocks 
Preferred Qommon 
2.9% 
16 .. 9 
10.5 
9.8 
5.9 
10.9 
2.6 
7.7 
12.9 
7.0 
26.1 
9.9 
22.7 
11.2 
25.l fo 
23.8 
17.0 
29.4 
34.2 
34.0 
33.7 
22.4 
29.3 
18.8 
32.1 
29.2 
43.1 
29.4 
Real 
E stat~ 
3.7% 
2.9 
19.1 
19 .. 9 
1.2 
7.6 
13.2 
0.3 
12.0 
3.5 
6.7 
6.2 
Total 
100.0% 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100 .0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
1 00.0 
100.0 
Avera@ 
Return 
----
3. 74fo 
3.70 
3.80 
4.55 
3.70 
( 2) 
( 2) 
3.78 
3.75 
3.73 
( 2) 
4.04 
4.88 
3.97 
(1) $ 8,000,000 was received from the Ca rnegie Corporation as of June 30, 1946--
not included here to avoid distortion of comparative figures. 
(2) I nformation not obtainable from reports received. 
Source: College Treasurers' report.s for the year ended June 30, 1946. 
....:] 
-.J 
. 
Te.bl e XIV 
Eook Value of Eleven Col l ege End owment F unds 
At June 30, 1946 
Colle~~ber Total Endowment Fund 
1. : 11,77 5 '7 61 
2. 8,928,384 
4. 28, 305, 517 
6. 86,795 '326 
7. 23,635,750 
12. 24,757 ' 394 
13. 6,531,187 
14. 38) 306,177 
15. 8,161 '008 
16. 31,786,033 
17. 12,756,840 
So~: College Treasurers' Reports for The Year Ended 
June 30, 1946. 
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Table XV 
Chief Sources of Income For Eleven Colleges 
For The Year Ending ,June 301 1946 
Expressed .A s !:er Cents of Total Income 
Colle~ From From From Gifts Other Total 
Number Endowments Students Jm d Grants 
l. 66. 3 3,..8 14.6 15.3 100.0 
2. 39.1 49.4 7.5 4.0 100.1 
4. 37.0 41 .9 14.1 7.0 100.0 
6. 15.5 16.1 7.6 12.9(1) 
29. 8( 2) 
~8.1 100.0 
7. 34.2 43.4 13.9 8.5 100.0 
9. 35.6 41.3 9.2 13.9 100.0 
13. 7.5 83.0 4.3 5.2 100.0 
14. 28.9 53.9 11.7 5. 5 100.0 
16. 46.9 24.7 5.~ 21. 8(1) 
1.5 100.0 
17 0 13.6 68 •. 9 5.4 12.1 100.0 
Average 32.3 42.9 9.3 15.5 100.0 
(1) Pat-ients' Fees. 
( 2) u. s . Government. Contracts. 
Source: College Treasurers' Reports for the y ear ended 
June 30, 1 946 . 
VII. The College Investment S ituation in 1951. Present 
Policies and Plans for The Future. 
~--Co~arison of the R~orts of The Colle~s Included in 
This Study--1951 Reoorts Compared w·ith Prior Years. 
For ~e year 1951, reports were received from 17 
colle ges, and additional breakdowns of information were made 
in order to hi ghlight the current situation. T ables XVI 
through XI X were prepared to cover the material received from 
the colleges relating to fiscal 1951. For 1951 a t able show-
ing diversification of oonds and preferred and comm on stocks 
was prepared according to the following classifications: 
Railroads, Public Utilities, Industrials ( includtng all 
securities t .hat could not be classified in the other group-
ings), Mining-oil, Financial, and Government.. This table 
reveals the diversification present in college endowment. 
fund portfolios at June 30, 1951.. Comparative fi gures are 
not available for this table with prior years, in the current 
study , but comparisons can be made with the results of other 
studies for the prior periods under study . 
. A. comparison according t ,o diversification can be 
made between the present study and the study of the American 
Council as reported in Table XXIII. A comparison reveals 
that: Railroad bond s, preferreds, and com mons were slightly 
higher percentage-wise in 1951 t han in 1943;· Public Utility 
bonds and p referreds were slightly under 1943 fi gures, while 
common stocks for 1951 were more tha n doubl.ethose of 1943 
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percentage-wise; Industrials bonds were down, and stocks--
both preferred s and commons--were up appreciably from 1943; 
and U. S . Bond s were over double those of 1943. The fi gures 
apparent ly reveal a dislike of bonds of all types--except 
U. s . Governments . Comparison of mining-oil and fin anci al 
c ategories was i mp ossible from the date. a vailable, but a 
definite preference for common stocks was seen--especially 
for Utilities in regar d to that of 1943 . This feeling for 
Utility commons was no surprise, a s college officials had 
expressed themselves after the war as f a voring such invest-
ments, especially in preference to industrial hard g oods 
stocks. 
.~s ide from comparat.i ve pur poses, Table XVII serves 
to indicette the widespread diversification that is evident. 
in colle ge investment portfolios at the p resent time. Appre-
ciable concentrations were found in only two fields--that of 
Industrial Commons, and that of U . S . Governments. In the 
field of industrial commons, it should be reme mbered that 
this c ategory is a broad one, and covers a multitude of types 
of industry . With the Governments, the high per cent of in-
vestment is a reflection of unsettled times and the colleges• 
desire to keep a somewhat liquid p osition before moving one 
way or the other . 
.Another com pari son can be made bet we en the results 
of t his study and another study as reported in Table XXV , 
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which reflects diversifice.tion by field of investment rather 
tha n by type of investment. A comparison would reveal that 
once a gain railroad securities of all types for 1951 were 
slightly ahead of 1946 p ercent age-wise on the average. Ut.il-
i~y investments of all t.ypes were up considerably compared 
to 1946--19 per cent as compared with an average of 12.5 per 
cent at tha t time. Industri a ls and Finance, on t -he other 
hand, were up only slightly from 1946. U. S . Governrrents 
were down appreciably from the 1946 total, reflecting the 
reinvestment of funds tied up during the war. 
One other fa.ct .o.r is present in the tables for 
1951--that of market value, wherever possibLe to obtain 
those figures. Nb.ile com pari sons and avera.ge s within e. 
table have not been attempt.ed because of the incompleteness 
of the data, it was felt that inclusion of the market value 
data. might prove worthy of consideration in t .-he realm of 
yields etc. 
~r·Uso to be considered is the fact that another 
bull market. had commenced for stocks, beginning in 1950--a 
market that held through 1950, 1951, 1952, and early into 
1953. In each succeeding year the Dow -Jones Industrial 
!.Average e.chieved ne w heights, and by late 1952 wa. s rivaling 
the high point of 1930. The market value figures, where 
available, tend to give emphasis t ,o this fact -or in d.eter-
mining the weight to be given t.o market values. 
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One evaluation has been attempted in the field of 
marke~ value as a per cent of book vaLue for some 14 colleges. 
This fi g ure does not reveal anything particularl~r start.ling--
market value on the average being some 116 per cent of book 
value; but it does serve to indicate that the college s with 
heavy invest.ments in common stocks had potential capital 
gains in their portfolios, as compared with potential capi-
~al losses through prior periods under study--when defaulted 
securities were held, and when market values were appreciably 
lower than the prices at which the colleges had bought the 
securities . 
.:A comparison of the 1951 figures from Table XVI 
with those of 1946 from Table XIII reveals that the trend 
wh ich was evidenced almost from t .he start of this survey 
was continuing on into 1951, and that the colleges were not 
losing their interest in common stocks by any means. .A 
glance at avera ges indicates that Government bonds had 
dro pped sharply in importance in portfolios, for reasons 
discussed above. The category of "Other Bonds" had also de-
clined, although not shaprly, indicating that colleges had 
not shift.ed from Governmen~s to other t .ypes of bonds . P re-
ferred stocks were down somewhat., indicating ~hat t .he col-
leges had found. that these securities were neither bond nor 
stock--that is, they had sacrificed safety and guaranteed 
income for a somewhat. higher rate than from bonds, and had 
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found that once in stocks, they might as well really go for 
income yield, if tha.t was their purpose. Common stocks con-· 
tinued to increase on the average in college portfolios, and 
were up from 29 per cent to 35 per cent of total portfolios 
based on book value. Nat.urally , when comparing market values, 
the importa nce of the equities in the portfolio becomes even 
more striking, because the lion t s share of incree.sed market 
value in any portfolio was in the common stock section. It 
should be noted., however, t .hat the colleges were purchasing 
common stocks at. the highest. levels in history--except 1929-30. 
Unfortunat.ely, many funds. also attempt t .o buy popular and 
fashionable stocks without searching inquiry into what stocks 
best fit their own needs. Only time will tell what their 
feelings will be in the next deflationary period. Real es-
tate and mortgages had increased somewhat, largely as are-
sult of the increase in opportunity for favorable invest.-
ment in that. field, and with the greater safety element for 
mort ga ges of t .he backing of v a rious governmental agencies. 
However, none of the changes reflecte.d in these 
tables has more importance to investment committees than that 
of the yield--perhaps the most import ant indic crl:. or of invest -
ment policy . The a verage y ield for 16 co l le ge s was 4 .7 3 er 
cent based on book v a lue , c ·omp ared wi th 3 . 97 per cent for 
1946 . This is a truly r emarkable increase in y ield in a 
period of fiv e y e a rs, an d can only be e xplained by the alert.-
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ness of college officials to the possibilities of getting full 
work out of endowment funds. This means» by and large, that 
the colleges with the greatest holding s in common stocks were 
the ones to benefit most, although of even greater importance 
and not. a.s e a sily seen from t.he tables is the factor of choice 
within the common stock category. In ather words» some col-
leges with lower-than-average percentages of equitcies ce.me 
out with hi gher-than-average yields. These colleges had made 
careful studies of the opportunit.ies in common st.ocks, and in 
many cases had, by shrewd purchases e.nd. sound management 
which oft.en meant. avoiding t .he favorites, received maximum 
yleld for a minimum dollar investment in an uncertain field 
such as common atocks. An analysis of t .h.e colleges within 
T able XVI highlights this important point. it comparison of 
colleges within Tables XIII and. XVI reveals that every col-
lege studied in 1946 and again in 1951. had increased its 
yield.--some quite dramatically, and others quite modestly. 
Also, every college increased its percentage of common stocks 
held. The two colleges with the highest yields in 1946 also 
had the hi ghest yields in 1951, indicating that good results 
in terms of income can be maintained over a period of time. 
Table XVIII reveals, as expected, that college en-
dowment funds stood at. record heights in June, 1951. Every 
college studied in 1946, except two, incree.sed its endowment 
fund, and most of the increases were quite sizeable. 
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Table XIX, S ources of Income, has been altered 
slightly from ~he tables in this field which have been ore-
... 
sented previously. A "Research n column has been added, be -
cause in ane.l yz ing the reports, it was found that many col-
le ges were receiving sizable grant.s for research either from 
the g overnment or from private a gencies. This item, in the 
period fro m 1946 to 1951, had. become vastly more important 
as a source of college income than heretofore. With t.he in-
elusion of rese a rch items, the tables are not as meaningful 
in comparison with prior years, because t .he other elements 
of income are almost, certain to decline tn importance if. a 
new one is added which accounts for, on the average, so me 11 
per cent of total income. With this factor in mind, i~ can 
be noted that endowment funds as a source of income declined 
to 21 per cent of t h e total as compared with 32 per cent in 
1 946 . This is a continuance of a trend whi ch wa s noted pre-
viousl.y. It is accent.uat.ed by the reason cited above. Stu-
dent income, however, has increased in import an ce as a source 
of income, and in 1951 comprised almost 50 per cent of total 
income. once again this is a continuance of a trend, and the 
constantly higher colle ge fees and tuition emphasize its im-
portance. It is all the more significant when compared to in-
crease s in gifts and grants, as well as the new field of re-
search mentioned before. The foregoing highlights the plight 
of the colle ges. Tremendous alumni drives for funds for 
current use have been conducted in almost all orivate insti-
.. 
tutions, and yet deficits continue, because inflation through 
mounting costs has forced t .he colleges t .o tap every source of 
income possible. The endowment fund.s then, while suffering 
a decline in importance, must be invested with great skill 
and wisdom in order to maintain their usefuliness to the col-
leges. 
By and large, the colleges with the greatest growth 
ln book value of endowment funds were the ones which had the 
highest proportion of total income from their endowment funds, 
and the college with an endowment fund decline also had a de-
cline in the importance of endowment income to the college. 
One other factor which should be mentioned at this 
point is that some of the colle ge s, as menttoned in the last 
chapter, had set up reserves from endowment income so as to 
guarantee t h e college a: set. return from the endowment fund in 
good y ears and in bad. The effect of this pro gram would be, 
of course, to hold back some of the income that would ordinarily 
go to meet colle ge expenses in 1951. Obviously, however, no 
easy solution t o the endowment fund problem is in ·the offing . 
F i n ance of fici als C8n only hope for de creased costs, i ncrea sed 
i n come from investment s , and vastly l ~r ge r endowment funds, if 
the colleges are to maintain their independence. 
B. Other Me.t .erial Per:taining To The Period 1951 And The Future 
Co mments from other sources for the year 1951 revealed 
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very similar findings to those already set forth in this chap-
ter. Most reports found that the colleges were meeting t.he 
problem of yields with more than passing success. The current. 
literature also stresses the swing to common stocks and t.he 
decline in favor on the Governments, also set forth previously 
in this chapter. Perhaps a typical comment is the following 
analy sis of Harvard's position in 1951~ 
The rise in Harvard's yield 
last year brought it to the highest point 
in 19 years. This problem of ret urn has 
been the toughest nut for endowment man-
agers to crack since t.he post-20's de-
cline in yield on the gilt-edged securi-
ties which once comprised almost all en-
dowment funds. Harvard last year recorded 
a yield of 4.85 per cen~ against 4.45 per 
cent the year before, based on book value. 
As might be expected, the larger 
role common stocks have been playing in all 
college investment programs has had a lot 
to do with Harvard's improved position. 
Commons now account. for 45.9 per cent of 
total net assets at marke~, compared with 
43.8 per cent the year before, in keeping 
with the trend indicative of almost. all col-
lege investments. U. S . Government Bonds 
continued to decline in importance. In the 
common stock section, significant. changes 
have taken place. Chemical and bank stocks, 
which had been important sections, decreased 
to about. one -third of their previous value. 
Tobacco stocks were eliminated, and Rail-
road holding s increased. The largest sin-
gle inve st.ment in any company was in Stand-
ard Oil of New Jersey, some 5.4 million 
dollars based on market value. * 
This analysis points out to the reader the continued 
~~ 16, p . 21. 
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emphasis. on Commons as t.h~ field of investment that offers 
most hope for sag ging college yields. As pointed out before, 
however, it is apparent that investing in equities is n ot 
enough in itself. Constant appraisal of the stocks carried 
within the Common Stock portfolio must be made. This se ems 
to be the procedure carried out by Harvard. When weakness 
in a particular industry or line appears to be in the offing, 
the investment committee must be alert to the possibility 
of re moving that class of stock from the portfolio in order 
to take profits and to prevent losses. 
A later analysis of the Harvard position , reflecting 
June 30, 1952 figures, reveal ed the following: 
1. The Endowment Fund reached ·· 309,000,000, an 
increase of some ~;· 35,000,000 over 1951. Capital a pprecia-
tion was the cause of most of the increase. 
2. Market. value was 135 per cent of cost., compared 
with 125 per cent in 1951 and 116 per cent in 1950--a fur-
ther reflection of the b ull market . 
3 . Yield was up sli ghtly from 19 51. 
4 . Major portfolio changes from 1951 showed a 
slight decline in c ash, U. S . Governments, other bonds, and 
preferred stocks. Common stock s continued to climb in impor-
tance and , based on r:~arket value, amounted to almost half of 
the entire portfolio percentage -wise. 
5. Rate of income paid to the University was 
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raised to 4.5 per cent of cost.. In 1950 and ~951 it had 
been 4.2 per cent, and from 1945 to 1949, 4.0 per cent. 
6. The t .rend toward consolidation into fewer, 
large ho~dings of common st.o cks continued. ·!f 
In 1951, an appraisal of the over-all college en-
dowment r ·und situat.ion was undertaken by Barron's, and some 
of the pertinent p·oin t s from that study follow: 
An 80 per cent increase has been 
made over the past t,en years in the t .ot al 
va lue of college endowments; since ~930, 
a ga in of 100 per cent has been registered. 
A second major trend was revealed: a swing 
in investment emphasia away from bonds and 
toward common stocks. Twenty years ago, 
although most. colleges had some holdings 
in common stocks, t .he majortt.y of port,folios 
were l .ar gel.y in bonds. Today, holdings in 
common st-ocks tota~ about 40 per cent of in-
vestments on an o.ver-al~ basis qompared 
with about ~5 per cent. in 1930. # The dis-
affection for bonds and the rise in common 
stock holdings is attributabl.e t .  o t ,he marked 
decline in bond yields. A t .hird conclusion 
is that a~though colleges have switched t .o 
common stocks in a search for more income, 
they have been unable t .o prevent. an over-all 
decline in income yields. 
Those col~eges which gave yield 
figures based on market value are perhaps 
more representative and show for 1950 an 
average yie~d of 4. 37 per cent.; in 1940 
the y ield averaged 4.50 per cent. and in 
~9 30, 4.97 per cent. Had it not been for 
increased common stock holdings, however, t -he 
average college picture might have been more 
like that of the University of Texas which 
in 1950 maintained a bond position repre-
# See Table XVI (1951 figures in this study) and Table IV 
(193~ figures in this study). 
I\" 8 6, p. 1 , 2, e.nd 4. 
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senting almost 98 per cent of its port-
folio and had a yield for the year# of 
2. 58 per cent based on book value J 
A college or uni versi t ,y must» 
after all, obtain income each year to 
meet its e xpenses. It cannot afford to 
maintain a large liquid posit.ion while. 
waiting for more favorable marke~ con-
ditions. It muBt do its best to pre-
serve its capital against t-he ravages 
of inflat-ion and other ha~ards, but its 
operations are nonetheless limited by 
the need for income. * 
Vt'bile the Barron's article highlighted many of t.he 
aspects of t .he · s~ tuati on which have also been point.ed out in 
this and the preceding chapters, the President. of Chatte.nooga 
University, writing in March, 1951, pointed out some other 
pertinent factors to be considered in t ,he endowment fund 
problem facing the colleges of "the nation. Some of the high-
li ghts from his article follow: 
Harvard University added 72 
million dollars to its invest.ments fro.m 
1929-1949, bringing the t .ota:l t.o 155 
million.H The purchasing power of its 
income remained the same. Most colleges 
have less to spend per student than a 
quarter of a cent.ury ago. College en-
dowment. funds exceed '32,250,000,000. If 
40 per cent of the 1948 current expenditures 
o.f privat-e inst.i t.u:tions, not. including aux-
iliary enterprises, however, were t .  o be 
paid from endowment earnings at 3.5 per 
cent., an endowment of some 8 billion dol-
lars would be required. That is more 
than three times the endowment ac cumu-
lated by t,hese colleges during the past. 
# See discussion of Harvard portfolio on pages 90 s.nd 91. 
-;:- 14 ' p • 5 . 
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two centuries. 
Trends in giving are upward 
and still climbing higher. Last year 
( 1949) giving passed the 200 mill ion 
dollar mark, compared with the highes~ 
year in the fabulous 20's of 139 mil-
lion dollars. Colleges are grateful for 
the '""' 200 million, but the interest on 
-~ 139 million would buy far more 25 years 
ago, and there were only e. fourth as 
many students dependent on this income. 
As a result of this failure of 
giving to keep pace with necessary spend-
ing and inflation, many colleges shifted 
from gilt-edge securities ~o common 
stocks. S ome tried operating businesses, 
fact.ories, stores, and hotels until the 
courts and congress compelled all such 
enterprises to pay taxes if not substan-
tially related t .o t.he functions of the 
U .J_I 
college. 'ff ·'" 
The points brought out. in the above article tend ~o reem-
phe.size in slightly different terms the basic need of t .he 
colleges for more income. T he factors of inflation and far 
greater student bodies are important in considering the over-
e:ll problem. The analysis above, when compared with the 
Sources of Income T ables used through t .he first chapters 
of this paper, gives new meaning to those tables. It is 
evident then, in studying the various articles written re-
cently on the subject, and as a result of analysis of the 
figures presented in tabular form in this work, tha.t the 
pToblem is a growing one; while college reports and articles 
~ See Chapter 10. 
-;r: 9 ' p • 111. 
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have been quoted throughout the paper so far to indicate 
t hat e a ch year ~he colleges thought their problems were as 
gr a ve as they would become, that in reality the problem is 
still with us, t hat it becomes more acute as colle ges face 
infla tion and the problem of ever-rising costs. 
It should be noted, perhaps at this point 1 tha.t 
college reports, as a whole 1 have vastly improved over t .he 
sketchy reports available in 1926 at the star-t. of this st udy . 
I n 1951, many colle ges used illustrative graphs and charts; 
many g ave very detailed breakdowns of their security port-
folios; others analyzed t.heir holdings by class and stressed 
diversification; many had. detailed Treasurer's ... eports, ana-
lyz ing the investment problem very carefully. Each college 
seems to be much more aware of the import a nce of careful 
analysis of its portfolio t h an at any prior time. Many col-
leges n oted market values for each security, listed bonds 
by quality and also by maturi t y dates , and , in ge ne r a l , 
s e eme d to take a very c a r eful att itude toward their port-
f olio s . 
c . .t!.i ffect s of HJ'he Chang ing_E mph9.sis on College Endowment 
Fund Investments"--Material P resented in l''irst Seven Ch apters 
And Other Changes To Be Described 
The purpose of this and the preceding five chapters 
has been to show one portion of t .he "chang ing emphasis" which 
this paper attempts to point out, in relation to college endow-
ment fund investments. This change has essentially been one 
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from "Gilt-Edge" bonds to the lowly equities. The change 
described so far has been slow-moving in most instltutions; 
in others it has hardly been a change at all. Just a s t h ere 
are colle ges that have adopted an a lmost all-stock posit.ion, 
there are college s which h ave he~d t..o "principles 11 throu gh 
g ood ti mes and bad and d o not intend to change t h eir ide a s, 
or the i r portfolios. At this point perhaps a comp arison 
with t h e t .ab le s accompanying Chapter I and those accompany-
ing this chapter would serve to illustrate this change. 
are: 
Among the difference s which have been cited before 
1. Change in yields 
2. Change in t.y pe of in ve st ment 
3. Change in portion of total income supplied by 
the endowment fund. 
Taking these points in order, one find s that the: average 
y ie l d for colleges i n this study , after a decline in inter-
venin g years, in ~951 averaged 4. 7 3 per cent as com p ared 
with 4 . 3 7 per cent for ~926. Eliminating col~eges which d id 
not supply ~926 data, the 1951 fi gure becomes 4.84 per cent; 
a further comparison of the colleges which responded in 1926 
and in ~951 reve a ls that those which were doin g we~l in ~ 9 26 
were generally doin g well in 1 951. However, since only five 
colle ge s could furnish y ield fi gures for 1 9 26, the sample is 
obv iously too smal l a one fro m which to draw any conclusions. 
In 1926 the avera ge percent.age in b onds was 71 per ce nt ; in 
1951 it was 44 p er cent--in cluding Governments. Common 
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stock s were 5 per cent of t h e portfolio on the average in 
1926, 8nd 35 per cent in 1951. In 1926, endowment income 
accounted for an average of 45 per cent of total income. 
In 1951, it accounted for only 21 per cent on the average. 
As stated before, these comparisons are not meant to be 
indicative of the situation for all colleges, but they point 
out that profound changes were , and still a re, in the making 
as far as college endowment funds are concerned. 
The changes which have been describe.d so far were 
perhaps the major ones of this period under study, but they 
were by no means the only changes taking place. Later chap-
ters will point out the changes that have arisen in such 
fields as investment counsel, formula plans, real estate 
investments, ownership of corporations by trusts for college 
benefit etc. One profound change which has been mentioned 
before, but bears rep e ating is the change in attitude toward 
the problem of investing endowment funds. This changing 
attitude is evidenced in many ways--in the form and contents 
of financial reports, in papers that have been written by 
those entrusted with investment of portfolios and so on. 
This change is the one which has dominated the scene and 
which has prompted the changes made so far and the changes 
to come. Its effect in some fields has been described; its 
effect in other fields will be described in the next chapters. 
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Table XVI 
Percenta~Distributi on of In~tment s By Type For Seventeen Colle~~ 
At June 30, 19~~nd Aver~Yields For The Year Endi~ Jlli1e 3~ 1951 
( P'er_cent_age_~are 9f _Bog_lS._{~or Market _(hfl) _ _y;aiue~ _i!t J_une_ 30 , 1951) 
College Cash And 1!..:..._§.!.. Other PreL., Common g~!. .Average Market Value 
Number Short Term Gov' t s. Bonds Stocks §:tocks E state Rate of As~_Qf_B ook 
--- ---- Return Value 
---
1. B. l.l ;Y~ 16. 6?~ 39 . 87{ 11.1 1~ 29.0% 2 . 4% 4.43% 115. 7 {o 
2. B. • 6 23.3 22. 2 20.1 3 2.0 1.8 4 . 68 
M. - 21.9 20. 3 17.4 38.4 2.0 - 107.6 
(at. 5/31/51) 
3. B. .8 37.3 6.4 8.9 40.0 6.6 4.99 112.3 
4. B. 
-
19.9 43.1 10.9 26.1 
-
4.06 
M. - 1 8 .4 39. 4 9.7 32. 5 - 4.01 105.5 
5. B. 
-
61.8 18.2 3.0 17.0 - 3.68 106.4 
6. B. 2.4 14.5 22.7 7.9 29.7 22.8 6. 50 1 33.1 
7. ·--, 1 3 . 3 18.1 4.6 46.3 17.7 5.11 116.7 b. -
8. B. 
-
43.8 1.7 
-
52.0 2. 5 4. 70 (1) 
9. B. 7..7 25.9 21.7 7.4 35.8 1.5 4. 8 5 
M. 5.9 21.9 18.8 6.2 45.9 1.3 - 125.0 
10. B. 3.2 30.8 11.2 0.4 34.4 20.8 4.86 
M. 2.7 24.3 9.4 0 . 3 45.9 17.4 4.18 119.0 
1lr B. -· 7..8 17.9 28.6 39.0 6.7 3.36 ( 2) 
(cont. next page) (,() 
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. 
Colle~ 
Number 
12. B . 
M. 
13. B . 
M. 
14. B. 
15. B. 
16. B . 
l 7. B . 
Average 
Gash .And 
Short T erm 
l.l ~o 
0.9 
4.7 
4.0 
5.9 
Book Value l. 9 
Table XVI - cont. inued 
U. S . Other Pref. 
Gov' t s. EOi1dS stoCks 
38.4% 
32.6 
8.8 
7.9 
32.5 
21.9 
6.3 
10.0 
24.3 
ll.O% 
8.5 
25.7 
23.3 
10.6 
17.3 
24.6 
26.1 
19.8 
9. 2% 
7.9 
13.9 
11.9 
7.1 
26.6 
5.3 
13.9 
10.5 
Common Real 
Stocks Estate 
26.5% 
38.3 
51.6 
56.9 
29. 2 
34.2 
29.9 
44.1 
13. 8 7o 
11.8 
15.9 
29.9 
Average 
Rate of 
Return 
4.59% 
3.92 
4.85 
4. 58 
4 .. 38 
6.10 
35.1 8.4 4.73 
(16 col-
leges) 
Market Value 
As % of Book 
Value 
117. 2/'~ 
109.4 ' 
127.1 
(3) 
111.5 
121.4 
116.3 
(14 col-
leges) 
(l) Further information and more complete breal<:down impossible from data secured. 
(2) Percerit ages are based on the total of the General University Fund and the 
Consolidated Fund only (totaling .J 9, 91 3 ,744 out . of total endowment of 
~18,455,909.) Forty-one other funds have investments, but they were not 
analyz ed. No market value fi gures were g iven. 
(3) Summary sheet onl y provided. No financial ste.t ements or more complete breckdown. 
Source: College Tre a surers• Reports for the y e a r ended June 30, 1 9 51. 
t.D 
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'I' able XVII 
Diversification of Se curity Investments At June 30 , 1 9 51 
( Percentages are based on t he book v a lues of the t ot a l bonds and 
stocks a nd no~ upon the total of t he investment p ortfoli~) 
Col- Railroad Public Ut il . Industri a ls Mining -Oil Financi al 
lege Bond s St ocks Bonds Stocks Bonds Stock~ Bonds Stocks Bonds St ocks Govt . Ot'r'm' 
No. Pfd.C mn . Pf£.. Cmn. ±:_f d.:... Q!!!!}.. Pfd . Cmn. ---Pfd. Cmn. Bond.§.--
----
1. 9.6 . 8 .. 4 1 8 .1 3. 3 5.8 7.3 4.8 16.1 2 .4 .6 5. 3 1.2 1.8 2 . 6 17.1 2.8 
2. 2 .7 . 4 . 9 17.5 7.3 2.1 1. 8 11.3 20.0 . 4 1.2 3 .5 - . 5 6. 4 24.0 
3. 2.7 1.7 2.8 - 5. 8 9.1 4.2 2.619.6 - - 4 . 3 - - 7. 4 40 .3 
4.(1)12.5 - - 14.2 - - 11.9 - - 4 .5 - - - - - 19.9 37.0 
5. 5.5 - •. 1 5.7 . 8 2. 6 5.4 2.2 7.9 1.6 - 4.9 - - 1. 6 61.8 
6.(2)10.0 - - 5.4 .9 8 .3 13.8 9.4 25.9 1.3 -· - - .4 5.3 19.3 
7. 4 . 8 2.2 3.1 11.1 1.7 ll.3 4.6 1. 8 23.3 l. 5 - 11.1 - · - 7.4 16.1 
8. ( 3 ) 
I' I 
9. 8.4 .4 1. 2 5 • 7 Ll. • 7 10. 5 .1 1.9 14.8 .7 • 5 7. 2 3.1 . 7 5. 9 29.3 4.8 
10. 1.1 
-· 
1.2 .9, .4 3.~ 1 . 5\ l I I I 
• 
.l 31.1 
-
- 6.6 3.9 - 6. 8 43 .5 
I I \ 1; . . 
11. 10.1 3.4 2.5 ?.z', e·J3 :ll./.7 1 • 8 : 12 . 4 24 .9 .9 -· 5. 3 - - 1.1 8.9 2 .5 
. ' 
•I 
,' ' 
12. 3.8 • 4 . 8 .7 3 ~3 ., 8 .. 4 .1 · 7. 2 14.5 - - 3 .2 - - 4 . 3 4 6.0 7.3 
(cont . next page) 
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T able XVII - continued 
Col- Railroad Public Util. Industrials Mlning - Oil [.inancial 
lege BoridsSt.OCks Bond s S tocks Bonds Stocks Bonds Stocks Bonds S tock£ Govt.Ot her 
Pf d . C mn . Pf d . C rnn . Pf d . C mn • Pfd.C nm . Pfd.Cmn. Bonds 
13. 12.5 lo8 2.1 10.4 5.4 9 . 8 2 . 8 5.' 6 26.5 - 1.1 7.6 - - 5.5 8o8 
14(3 ) 
15. 9 .1 3 o7 • 6 6.9 7o7 9.3 l . 2 14 0 4 20 . 9 - - - - .7 3 .5 22.0 
16. 7.7 .4. .5 13.9 3.6 7.3 4o9 4. 4 24.9 l. 7 - 5. 9 1.9 - 6.2 9 .5 7.2 
17. 9.0 . 3 2 . 7 5. 3 5. 0 10.0 1.2 7 . 7 22.8 .7 - 4.9 3 .5 1.8 6.6 10.7 7.7 
Aver. 7. 4 1.0 1.4 8 , 3 3 .9 6. 8 4.1 6.4 21 . 3 1.0 .2 4o7 0 9 0 4 4 • 7 25 . 4 2 . 1 
(l) F inancial report does not l i st investments separately, so further break down 
was impossible. 
( 2 ) Industrial g rouping here is called "Industrial and Miscellaneous " in 
l<..,inanci al Report. tA s list of se curi t .ies was not printed , further breakdown 
was impossible . 
(3 ) Financial staternent.s do not list securities, nor give any analysis of them. 
So~~ College Treasurers' Reports for the y ear ended June 30 , 1951. 
t-' 
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Table XVIII 
Book Value of College Endowment. Funds At June 30~2_51 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
r 
o. 
7. 
8. 
9 . General 
Inve stment.s 
1 0 . 
ll. 
12. 
1.3. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17 . 
Total Endowment Fund 
$ 15,224,370 
11 , 285,321 
(at May 31) 
14,922 , 815 
30,022,115 
6,534 , 255 
85,416,338 
27 , 178,89 6 
5., 311,922 
231,498 , 555 
54,409,586 . 
18,455,909 
27,523,429 
8 , 805,398 
41,391,301 
7 ,966,4.81 
34,166,604 
18 , 128 , 071 
So~~ College Treasurers ' Reports for the year 
ended June 30, 1951 . 
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Table XIX 
Chief Sources of Income Fo r Fourteen Colleges 
For The Year Ending June 30,_1.951 
Expressed .A s Per Cents Of Total Income 
Col- From From From From 
le~ Endow- St.U: Gifts , nd Research Other 1' ota1 
No. ments dents Grants 
--- ---
l. 67.8 17.2 15.0 100.0 
2. 41.3 41.8 5.2 11.7 100.0 
3. 12.8 76.4 4.7 5.9 .2 100.0 
4. 26.2 42.1 31.0 .7 100.0 
5. 3.2 60.0 36. 8 100.0 
6. 9.0 17.3 8.1 53.8 11.8 100.0 
7. 28.0 52.0 15.6 4.4 100.0 
8. 30.7 61..2 8.1. 100.0 
1.0. 6.5 22.8 9.0 61.1. • 6 100.0 
ll. 2.9 77.3 2 .• 7 17 ~ 1 100.0 
13. 8.2 79.7 8.0 ---- 4.1 100.0 
1.4. 16.5 47.0 1.8.7 17.1. .7 100.0 
]._ 6. 25.5 28.9 10.8 34.8 1 00.0 
17. 14.2 74.2 5.0 6.6 100.0 
Aver. 20 .9 48.7 12.3 11.5 6.6 100.0 
S ource~ College Treasurers ' Reports for the year ended 
June 30, 1951. 
VIII. The Rising Import ance of Formula Plans 
.A . Purpose of Formula Plans 
It. i s not the purp ose of this paper to go into a 
long tech nica l discussion of what . "formule. plans" are, but, 
r e.ther, to point out t h e direction which seems to be fol-
lowed with regard to such plans. In keeping with the theme 
of chan g ing emphas i s, this chapt .er will try to point out 
what h a s happened and what is likely to. happen as regards 
the use of formulas by the colleges. 
The need for formulas seems to have arisen as col-
le ge fiscal officers came t .o realize that they acted in in-
vestment matt.ers as any individuals would; t .hat is, they 
tended to buy stocks when t .hay were doing well and to sell 
them when they were doing badly. The crying need fo.r more 
intelligent investment action has accomp anied the switch 
from bonds to stocks and ha.s, perhaps, been one of the chief 
problems accompanying that switch. 
The great crash of 1929 did not highli ght the need 
for better s tock control in the colleges to any great ex tent, 
for, a s wa s stated previously , the colle ges at. that time were 
in a strong bond. position. Rather, the real impetus toward 
formula pl ans fallowed the financial reversals of 1938, com-
ing at a time when the colleges were starting to invest rather 
heavily in equities. The need then became apparent t .o many 
for a plan that would help the committees t .o purchase stocks 
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at the ri ght time when ~hey are cheap and to disp ose of them 
before they became t .oo expensive. It was felt that such a 
p l an would have to be one that would concentrate on the long 
pull and more or l.ess i gnore small sce.la upheave.l s in the 
mar k et and t h ereby guide t,he committees t h rou gh t h e regul a r 
waves of pessimism and opt imism that mark the stock market. 
Ther e are many t ype s of fo r mul a p lans in use b the 
various colleges, but all have cert a i n common cha r a cte rist i c s . 
.A mong the cha r a cteristics are the t yp ica.l two part s of any 
for mula p lan:: 
1. Defensive or stable p or~i on--cash , bank deposits 
or securities whose p rices remain fairly stable, s uch as bonds 
of at least b ood grade, or high-grade preferred stocks. 
2. Aggressive or volatile portion--securities whose 
p rices move u p and down, such as common stocks, s peculative 
preferred stocks or defaulted bonds. * 
E s s entially then, every formula plan :Is merely an 
attempt to re gulate ~he proportions of it s hol.dings in the 
t wo cl as ses of its endowment fund as cited above. The main 
area of re gulation is n a turally in the latter--the a gg ressive 
portion. Here is the area in which forces are constantly at 
work to uo set the carefullv calculated formula. Here is where 
~ v 
the real work of t h e formula comes into play . 
Two factors are involve d i n ~he second category, 
-~ 2, p. 15. 
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that of investing in common stocks, what. stocks to buy a:nd 
when to buy or sell. Of t h ese t.wo, "when" is often more im-
port ant t han "what ". 
Due to t ,he characteristically 
wide price fluctuation of even the hi gh -
grade co mm on stocks, formula plans are 
an atte mpt to solve the '~hen " problem, 
often referred to as timing, without the 
need of forecasting . E very formula 
method of investment timing is de signed 
to compel the sale of stocks in rising 
markets and the purchase of stocks in 
declining market-s--not designed to se-
cure spect a cular results but to derive 
some benefits from the fluctuations in 
stock prices and to protect against the 
very human inclination to buy stocks 
when they are doing well and to sell 
them when they are not doing well. * 
From the foregoing it becomes apparent that the 
maj or purpose of formul e. plans is t..o fill in the gap of "when" 
to act. F ormula. plans help to combe.t ~he feeling of buy ing 
and holding wh ich proved di sast.rous to many in the past.. But 
sti 11 another rea s on is present for the use of formul a ple.ns 
and it is a reason once brought about. by the "changing empha-
sis". As stated previously, most college investment decisions 
reflect t he action of a board. Very often it is difficult if 
not nearly impossible to get a group of financial co mmittee 
membe rs to agree to any particular plan, especially if it 
seems to run against their emotional feelin gs about the mar-
ket at any particular time. However, under a formula plan, 
action is encouraged, if not altogether mandatory, at certain 
\ # 19, p. 3. 
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times in the financi a l cy cle. Most co mmi ttees t hat have 
dealt with t h e investment proble m have agreed that under a 
formul a p lan action ha s been speede d up and valuable time 
formerl y alloca t ed to "when" coul d better be spent on "what " . 
The colle ges using formul a plans have felt, by and large, 
that the use of such plans has enabled the finance commi ttee s 
to concentrate on improving the s~ocks within the portfolio. 
F rom Vassar comes the rep ort 
that in eight and one-half y ears under 
the ope ration of the common stock con-
trol pl an, there h as n ot been a disagree-
ment e.mong finance committee members i n 
regard to the purchase or sale of stocks . 
Oberlin College states that the commit-
tee used to s p end two-thirds of its time 
de bating whether stocks should b e in-
creased or decreased and one-third of 
its time deciding on individual issues. 
Now the p roportions are reversed. ~f 
Another advantage in addition to those stated above 
is the one of providing for continuity in action within a 
group that has membership changes from time to time. It is 
felt by proponents of formula p lans that such plans tend to 
serve as a link bet ween past actions of a committee and pre-
sent and future committees. .Also, if committee meetings are 
infre quent, the formula plan can be tailored to fit the chan-
ges in the market that may occur between committee meetings. 
If action is indicated by a plan, the a.ction can be inst.it.u-
~ed by the treasurer without calling a special committee meet-
.;:- 2, p. 22. 
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ing to investi gate the situation. Many other reas ons h ave 
been adv anced for using formula plans , but perhap s t h e most 
important one of a ll is . the one that was hinted at in the 
opening of this discussion --that of controlling the emotional 
fact or. 
A formula plan, as indicated so far, serves a va ri-
ety of needs and purposes . There are, however, some p.oints 
that sh ould be brough t out about what formul a plans will not 
do . In p reced i ng chapters, mention has been made n ot only of 
the swin g to stocks, b ut also of the growing awareness of in -
vestment co mmittees to other p rob le ms inherent in a dep a rt ure 
fro m a 11bond 11 fund . One of t he problems mentioned is one 
that formula plans do not profess to help to solve; the prob-
lem of s election of individual securities within a portfolio . 
With a formula plan , t he need is still as urgent as ever of 
b uyin g the best p ossi b le securities for a particular segment 
of the investment p ortfolio . When the p l a n indicates that 
stocks should be sold, it does no.t indicate which ones should 
go . Shifts within a portfolio classification depend on the 
judgment and ab ility of the committee members. 
Miss 'l' omlinson has the following t "o say with re gard 
to choice of securities: 
The ideal t ype of stock for use 
with a formula pl an is one which combines 
long-term growth p ossibilities with a high 
degree of volatility. In other words the 
ideal is the type of s.tock which consist-
ently goes up faster than the market 
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average and declines more slowly. (Not 
many issues like this.) 
As a general rule, volatile 
securities present less difficulty in 
selection and are more certain to per-
form as desired than growth stocks. But 
the use of volatile securities requires 
even broader diversification than the 
use of investment grade stocks and the 
requirements of careful selection and 
continuous supervision are just as im-
p ort ant. 
In the long r un greater capi-
tal app reciation under a formula plan is 
obtained by using f a st-moving classes of 
securit.i es than by using growth issues 
with averag e volatility. However, the 
examples also show that temp orary depre-
ciation, when a decline occurred before 
any profits could be s t ored up, was 
g reater when highly vol~tile securities 
were used. * · 
B . Types and Typ icaL Examples of Formula Plans 
And The Future For Formulas 
Several distinct types of formula plans have been 
devi sed and countless modifications have been devised ~o suit 
individual colle ge needs. No attempt will be made here to go 
into the technical aspe cts of the p lans, but rather, a mere 
listing will be atte mpt ed and a b rief description of the pur-
p ose and gener al objectives. A listing of types should in-
elude the followin g : 
1. Const ant dollar--a fund in which the se.me dollRr 
amount is always kept invested in stocks. This means that as 
the· do llar val ue (at market) of the common stock p ortfolio 
~(- 2, p. 24. 
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increases, se ll ing is called for ~o reduce the holdings to 
t h e proper dollar amount. Conversely, in a f a lling market 
more s t ocks are purchased to bring the dollar va lue up to 
the prescribed amount. fairly simple type of plan wi th 
emphasis placed on securities within a portfolio which shoD.ld 
be sold or held. 
2. Constar:lt r at io between stocks and bonds. Under 
this t y pe of plan, a set percentage of the total fund is k ept 
in stocks at all times--if the percentage is 40 per cent, ~he 
stock se ction of the p ortfolio is kept to this figure. The 
wor k in g of this pilan is similar to the first in tha t it en-
courages increased investment in e quities at the same time that 
the doll a r plan does. An important difference is that as the 
fund g rows, and as profits are t aken, the same percentage of 
the tot a l fund me.y be a va stly dif ferent dollar am ount in good 
times tbe.n in be.d. 
3. Variable stock bond r_atio--usua lly tied to the 
Dow-Jones Index, or similar guide. Under this type of pl an 
the prop ortions of stocks and b onds v a ry according to the 
st anding of the index used. /l.s the index cl i rnbs, the per 
cent of stocks declines and as the market declines, the per 
cent of stocks increase s . Upp er and lower limits can be set, 
and the change in t .he a verage re quired to cause a shift in 
hol.d ing can b e large or small depending on the pl an used. A 
problem is present here of selecting the base or median ~o 
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use as a normal relationship between stocks and bonds. This 
plan offers the most variations of any and is usue.lly more 
co mp licated in its workings. 
4. Dollar avera g ing (not rea lly a formul a plan)--
used mostl y by small-sca le investors and institution s with 
limite d funds wh o could not qualify for a more hi gh-po!Ve red 
plan. The be.s i s of the plan l s a simple one. -.4t stated in-
terv al s , a previously indicated dollar amount is invested in 
e quities. The idea is to balance costly p urcha. ses with chee.p 
one s, an d to "average" the cost of the holding s. Use d t .o a 
considerable extent by colle ges with very s mall endowments, 
and those with limited income which can be invested. 
P erhaps the t wo most widely quoted formul a p l ans 
are those of Vassar College and Oberlin Colle ge. The Vassa r 
Plan was one of the pione ers in the field of formula plans, 
being instituted in 1938. The year was a logical one to 
start a formula plan , because , as st a ted above, with the col-
leges heavily in stocks, the decline experienced at that time 
h i ghli ghted the need for some type of control over investment 
timing . The Vassar Plan is of the third type discussed above ; 
that is, it is a Variable St ock o ond Rati o type of plan, based 
on the level of the Dow-Jones Industrial Index. The p lan was 
ori g inally a pplied to about one-third of the entire endowment 
fund, later exp anded considerably, e.nd provided for a median 
level ab ove which no purchases of stocks are made and bel ow 
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which no SRles of stocks take place. Hi~h-grade bonds and 
preferred stocks, carried at market value, constitute the 
bond a ccount. Investment typ e common stocks, reas onably ac-
tive for easy liquidation, def a ulted bonds and non-dividend-
paying p referred stocks make up the stock portion of the fund. 
Purchases and sales are made as soon after action is indicated 
as p ossibl.e, and are made in fairly equa.l amounts right across 
the List. Once the mechanics of the plan are determined, it 
c a n work as a bove, but forec a sting is needed to some e xtent 
e a ch year, inasmuch e.s the Investment Committee must decide 
the median line and the scale of purcha s e and sale p oints above 
and below that line for the year. 
In 1941, Mr. Ray Morris, chairman of the comm ittee 
on investments and finance of Vassar College, made the follow-
ing statement in regard to the need for t.b.e plan at Vas s ar: 
For a time we sold rail bonds 
on advances in the market and bought com-
mon stocks at the same time, but we soon 
reali z ed that this was an error in judg-
ment because the ri ght market in which 
to sell bond s was not the right market in 
which to buy stocks .••. The finance commit-
tee set up a common stock control plan in 
the summer of l938. ~f 
Several years later, in 1944, the Investment Commit-
tee of Oberlin College set up a Formula. Plan, also based on 
the level of the Dow-Jones Industrial average. The plan, a 
variabLe stock bond rc-.tio, provides for a progressive median 
line based on the secular trend. The Investment Committee 
-:<- 19' p. 3. 
111. 
does not use the plan as inviolable, but rather as e. guide 
for the plan forbids stock purcha ses above the median line or 
sales below it. At the median level, a 40 per cen~ stock, 
60 per cent b ond position is considered normal. The stock 
percentRge is reduced at each 10 per cent rise above the 
med i an and increased at each 10 per cent d.ecline from the 
median. A. maximum stock position of 65 per cent and a mini mum 
of 10 per cen~ are planned but would be re a ched only above 
400 or bel ow 75 on the Dow-Jones Index. All general invest.-
ments, including mortgages and real est a te, which are included 
with bonds for purposes of the plan, come under the guidance 
plan. Securities are carrie d at market value, re a l est a te and 
mortgages at book v al ue. -::-
The Treasurer's Reports received for this study from 
Oberlin reflect considerable study of the securities carried 
in the portfolio, and each t y pe of security is carefull~r ana-
l yzed in the report. The p lan at Oberlin has been very suc-
cessful to date. 
Perhap s one ather plan should be mentioned here, a. 
plan wh ich has been k e y ed to particul ar objectives--income 
and capital conservation. It is the Yale Plan, a very rigid 
type of plan when compared to the two previously discussed. 
Th is plan, a constant stock-bond ratio t ype, wa s put 1rito 
effect in 1938. The normal stock-bond ratio is 30-70. In a. 
-,~ 2 ' p • 128 . 
112. 
rising stock market, the ratio of stocks to the total fund 
is permitted to rise to 40 per cent. In a declining market 
no purchases of stocks are made until the ratio drops to 20 
per cent of the total fund. High-grade bonds, carried at par 
value, ana preferred stocks, carried at market value, consti-
tute the fixed income portion. Co mm on stocks, defaulted 
bonds, and non-dividend-paying preferreds, all carried at 
market value, constitute the stock port ion of the fund.·::-
It is evident, even from the b a re sampling of plans 
indicated above, that each one should be tailor-made to fit 
the type of portfolio at hand, and that while one plan may be 
ideal for one colle ge, it may work out very poorly for another. 
Colleges contemplating formula plans would do well to investi-
gat e as many as p ossible, and to compare the results of those 
having funds at hand commensurate with their own. A compari-
son of the differing results of t wo p lans discussed above was 
made a few years ago. 
A criticism of the Vassar Plan 
is that it makes no allowances for the 
extremes in market swing s which have oc-
curred in the pas t 30 years. If the 1914 
and 1932 lows of near 40 in t ,he Dow-Jones 
Industrial Index are rea ched again, and 
if the Va ssar Plan is ri gi d ly adhere d to, 
t he F und will s it on a 1 00 pe r cent stock 
p os ition through nearly 65 points decline. 
Also , if another '29 is coming , the Vassar 
Fund will have no stocks at all whi le the 
market is going from 195 to 386 in the 
averages. The Yale Plan funds on the other 
·~ ~- 2, p. 139. 
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hand will be a periodic a l bqyer of equities 
a.s long as a declining market. lasts, but 
will never be entirely out of fixed income 
securities, while in e. larger bull mar ket , 
it will still have some stocks to sell, no 
rnatte:r: how hi gh the averages may go. The 
Yale Plan, however, requires rather large 
market swings before any change is made in 
its holdings. ~" 
From the above it can be seen that t h e Vassar Plan 
is a much more sensitive one than the Yale Plan. One is de-
si gned to take advantage of moderate swin g s in the market, 
while the other, reacting slowly, is designed only to catch 
the me. jor upheavals. Ee.ch was t e. ilored to the circumstances 
prevalent in the respe ctive endowment funds. 
The use of formula plans as e. management device is 
a compar atively recent ·one. As late as 1944, the American 
Council on Ed ucation S tudies found fe w college s ar:nong the 130 
queried (including all of those in the p resent study ) who 
were at that time using formula plans. Many , however, were 
study ing such plans • .,H~ A t ,ypical comment resulting from that 
study was as follows: 
We do not use a formula plan, 
but we are considering such a matter at 
this time . I have s pent some time withln 
the last fe w months investi gating v a rious 
plans, and I am proposing to our invest-
ment co mm ittee that we do est ablish such 
a plan as would seem to fit our needs and 
req uirements and abide by it for at least 
part of our fund. I believe that a well-
-)~- 23, p. 133 . 
.,:--,:- 3 , p. 20. 
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devised formula plan could be of mat.erial 
he 1 p t o us . -:<-
As indicated previously, the trend toward stocks 
had by no means reached its crest in 1944, and when it will 
still remains in doubt. At any rate, the factors which 
seemed to point to wider use of formula type plans in 1944 
are as forceful today as they were then. With many of the 
colleges in the present study already using formula plans 
or outside professional management of their portfoltos (such 
as Harvard does), and with compelling reasons for using 
formulas still present, the future use of formula plans would 
a ppear to be of ever greater significance. The use of form-
ula plans has obviously been one of the major evidences of 
the changing emphasis in college endowment fund investments. 
;c 5, p. 21. 
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IX. Other Changes In The Field Of College 
Endo wment Fund Investments 
A . Use of Investme n t Counsel ..And Investment Trusts 
Another of the changing elements in the college en-
dowment fund investment problem has been that of the ernphasi s 
which h9.s been placed on the need for e x )ert management of 
portfolios. Once again, this change has been directly related 
to other changes and is another in the list of results from 
the common cause--the switch to a stock-type portfolio. 
When colleges invested heavily in bonds, and when 
there was a plentiful supply of sound investments in that 
cate g ory, mostly with satisf a ctory yields, colle ge investment 
committees had a fairl y simple t ask --that of investing in 
bonds of a cert a in stability as indicated by ratings assigned 
to such securities by the leading investment service firms. 
The re a l pro blem then was to decide which rating of bonds 
should be use d as the minimum to be purchased, be a ring in 
mind yie ld and strength. 
The problem that arose in this field with the ad-
vent of portfolios heavily weighted with com mon stocks was 
a much more complex and exacting p roblem. Colle ges attempted 
to meet the problem in various ways; some t .urned to formula 
plans as discus sed in the preceding chapter; others att.empted 
to strengthen their investment committees by the addition of 
men who were experts in the investment field; still others 
tried to shift some of the problem entirely into expert hands. 
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This last group is what this portion of the chapter will deal 
with. The American Council on Education Studies, in its last 
three bulletins, recogni ze d this p roblem and gave more and 
more space to presentations of colle ges' attitudes on this 
comple x subject. In the first of the studies mentioned above, 
the Council found one institution with more than 89 per cent 
of its p ortfolio invested in bonds; another had 53 per cent in 
common stock s; a third h ad 69 per cent in mort gages; another 
had less than one per c e nt i n bonds ; others le ss t s.n one-
half per cent in stock s, and severa l wi th no mort gages . * 
Wh ile most of these colleges were enjoying satis-
factory results under such widely diversified holdings, they 
also highli ghted the need for some form of planning that would 
make a strong and diversified portfolio for the colleges. At 
the same time the Council found that colle ges with well-managed 
portfolios were obtaining the best results possible. Many had 
estaolished the equivalent of small investment counsel services 
of their own. However, the Council also found that many port-
folios were being managed as poorly as any portfolios could 
be. One comment received by the Council was as follows: 
-;~ 4, p. 6. 
Investments are usually placed 
under the responsibility of a so-called 
finance committee, consisting of a few 
prominent bankers, brokers, or wealthy 
merchants and manufacturers, in whom the 
mere possession of wealth presupposes an 
ability to manage investments, I am 
11?. 
aware that in too many cases a man's elec-
tion to the board of trustees, and perhaps 
to the finance committee as well, is oromn -
ted by the hope and expectation of a ~ona: 
tion rather than by the value of the indi-
vidual's attention to the management of the 
fund. This is a great mistake. -:~ 
Co up led wi.th weak investment commi t .t ees were the 
ideas that investment counsel would be too expensive or that 
the use of such counsel would be a reflection on the abilities 
of the members of the investment committee. The report of the 
Council g oes on to state in forceful language: 
We need all the competant ad -
vice we can obtain from investment coun-
selors, bankers, and other e xperts to 
whom we may have access, from men who 
are continually studying the security 
markets and the real estate markets. 
Occasionally they will make mistakes, 
b ut they will be honest errors of judg-
ment, and not nearly so frequent or 
co stl.y as no judgment at all. -3Hf 
The above re port made in 1942 cautioned its readers 
about what to expect in the future if careful and expert man-
agement was not utilized in the handling of the endowment 
fund investments. In another re p ort the Council explored 
the idea of pooling investment counsel, in an effort to dis-
tribute exper~ advice to as wide a number of institutions 
as possible . However, many college trustees felt that they 
did not have the power to depend on such an out side agency ; 
others felt that the p l an would be a success as long as its 
-:,- 4, p . 8. 
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advice proved benefi ciel 1 but e.s soon as any errors occurred 1 
the plan would be scrapped. Others thought that such a ·plan 
would greatly benefit small colleges who could not aff ord 
expert counsel, even if avail ~b le. The conclusion, ac cording 
to the Council , wa.s that the idea was not pre.ctical 1 and the 
Council could merely look forward to the day when some solution 
might b e found. -:::-
The final report of the Financial. Advisory Service 
of the Council 1 prepared in 1944, · reported considerably more 
pro gress in the field of investment counsel. For the prepa-
ration of this report the Council asked the 130 colleges under 
study if they employed investment counsel, and, if so , on what 
b asis . The Council found t hat one-half of the twenty largest . 
endowment funds had investment offices of their own ; others 
reported that they employed investment counsel on a straight 
fee basis; and others consulted trust officers. Of the other 
110 lnstitutions studied, 36- per cent reported that they used 
no investment counsel; 31 per cent re ported that they used 
investment counsel on a straight fee be.sis; 19 per cent stated 
tha t they used investment. services of trust companies; and 14 
pe r cent felt that they had well - qualified investment ex perts 
on their finance committees. -)C- ~f 
This last study i nd icated that mu ch progress had 
-:~- 5, p. 20. 
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been made in the field of investment counsel, and the still 
more imp ort a nt fact had been uncovered that the colleges were 
showing increa se d interest. in the problem of findin e; adequate 
investmen t counsel. T he report also d.i scl o sed, however, that. 
a ll was not perfect by any means. 
It is not easy to persuade col-
lege presidents, insura.nce companies, 
foundations, or other people who have had 
broad experience in i nvesting money to 
lay bare their errors of judgment for the 
benefit of others. There is little doubt 
that many college portfolios contain secu-
rities which are worth f a r less than cost 
or book ve.lue. -:~ 
The Council ap parently felt that there was still 
considera ble room for improvement. Later on in its analysis 
the Council report st e ted one phase of the problem as follows: 
Colle ge investment officers 
will recall that few investment services 
existed t wenty-five years e. go. Portfo-
lios consisted of railroa.d, gas light, 
and street railway bonds for the most 
part ...• The investment committees, if 
they existed, had no problems. They 
purchased 5 per cent bonds, or evan 6 
per cent securities, and preceded t .o 
dismiss the care of securities from rou-
tine attention .... some fe w colle ges are 
still operating under what the American 
Bankers Associe.t ion has termed the "Rip 
Van Winkle philosophJr " of turning over 
once and then sleeping ; or perb ap s they 
have gr a duated to what the association 
calls the "council of warn or "wigwam 
theory ", the pernicious pra ctice under 
which one man (or a small group) picks 
out his favorite type of securities. He 
sways the decision of the board while 
~~- 3, p. 17. 
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other members of the committee, having no 
knowledge of investments and groping for 
the correct answer to the problem, assent 
with the usual "Amen 11 • The unf crt unate 
results are a pparent. -><-
The merican Council, in 1944, felt that. much pro-
g ress had been made as far a s improving qualit y and diversi-
fic a tion policies were concerned, but it also reported that. 
many institutions were still in the dark ages as far as in-
vestment counsel was concerned. Needless to say, -the pi cture 
at the present time shows still more colleges utilizing al l 
the expert advice that they can. Of the colleges in the pre-
sent study--all of which were included in the Council studies--
most employ either their own investment. couns el or pay for 
such counsel from out s ide experts. ~any of the colle ges in 
this study were pioneers in the field, largely, of course, 
because they were by and large the ones with the large st 
p ortfolios--the ones who bad the bigg est stake in t ,erms of 
dollars. 
It would appear, then, that the solut.ion for the 
larger colleges, as far as diversification and capital p ro-
tection are concerned, would be to secure competant profes-
sional investment counsel, either on a full-time management 
basis--as many of the le.rgest colleges do; or to hire in-
vestment counsel on t .he outside on a fee basis. The que s-
t ion then arises: "What about the small colle g e which can 
not afford such counsel, and which at the se.me time has 
problems of its own in investments?" 
.;;- 3. p. 18. 
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Many college s with limited fund s have turned to 
other solutions to the problem. One of the most. widely used 
p lan s for the s mal l college--as well a s for the smal l . in-
vestor--is that of the Investment Trust. Fund. The idea here 
is a fairly simple one. By investing in mutual trust shares 
of the Invest ment trusts, a college can secure diversifica-
tion indirectly through the diversif i ed holdings of the trust, 
I t can l i k e wise secure a reasonable degree of safety and , 
above all, a respect able y ield. In effect, through such in-
vestments the small colle ge can secure the competent invest-
ment advice which its limited funds would otherwise prohibit. 
Another possibility, particularly for the college 
with a limited endowment, might be the creation of an invest-
ment company for college endowments. S uch a comp any could 
operate a long the lines of the investment company formed in 
New York in 1952 for the investment. of s e.ving s bank funds 
in equities. T he New York company is expected to bring many 
of the smaller and medium-sized b ank s into the e quit y invest-
ment f i eld. Through ownership in the shares of a similar 
company, small colleges could obtain diversification and 
management not available to them previously. Such a compan y 
would differ from the usual investment share company in that 
it would concentrat e on solution of problems peculi a r to the 
colle ge endowment fund. In this way, many colle ges wh ich have 
a voided e quities in the past might be willing to have an in-
direct investment in them. 
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B. Trends in Unusual. Tye_es of Investments 
l.. for poration Ownership. 
One of the more significant changes in the field of 
colle ge investments received a tremendous spurt in the late 
thirties and throughout the forties. This was the investment 
in t h e nation's businesses, either directly fro m endowment 
funds, or more indirectly through a.lumni corporations set up 
for the purpose. The idea was a relatively simple one and at 
the same time a very attractive one from the standpoint of 
the colle ge finance committees. If the colle ge bought con-
trol of the business, it. was argues, the profits from the 
business going t .o a college would thus be exempt from the in-
come tax. In this way, colleges competing with private busi-
ness, under the l.oad of heavy taxes, would be in a strong 
profit p osition. T he idea appealed to many and was e.ppa:r-
ently to spre ad 1 i k e wil dfire before Congress could enact 
l aws to cover l.e ga l loopholes in the tax l aw s . 
The ext ent of the college entrance i n to a seemingly 
alien fi e ld wa s pointed out in 1 9 49 in Business Week. 
For ty per cent of endowments 
are now directly invested in business or 
real est a te. Ex cept for life insurance 
comp anies, schools ar~ prob ably the 
largest owners or lessors of retail 
stores. One pa rticular sore spot for 
industry is that colle ge-owned or -oper-
ated businesses do not have to pay the 
38 per cent federal tax on corporate 
earnings. 
Ordinarily colleges have t .wo 
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main sources of income: 1) tuition fees, 
and 2) income from endowment funds plus 
gifts .... Gifts have been way down since 
the wa r; so h a s income from endowment 
fund s. S o the colleges have turned to 
industry ••.. 
Not all the colle ge officials 
feel the comrnerci al investments are worth-
while. Their main criticism is that a 
lot of the buying will ende.n ger the schools' 
f uture financi a l positions. ~ 
Colle ge invest ments in industry had become so im-
port ant in 1948 that the New York T imes r an a front page 
art ic l e dealing with t h e me.tter. Highlights of t he Times' 
rese a rch were, tha t of some 1380 institutio-ns stlldied, 455 
were in one form or another of business from which they 
e a rned a tota l of some ~150 million. Perhap s t h e out.st a nd-
ing c a se discussed was that of N. Y. U. 's ownership under 
a trust arrangement whereby control of the C. F. Mueller Com-
pany was vested in the hands of an alumni corporation. This 
ownership me ant that New York University's Law School was to 
receive the firm's profits--some $ 600 to ~} 800 thousand a nnu-
ally. The firm, as a priva te b usines s used to pay s ome · .~ 240 
t o .; 300 t h ous and annually in taxes. -.'HfThe survey a lso pointed 
out: 
Colle ges now own such v a ried con-
cerns a s a s p a ghetti f actory, a cattle 
r anch, an En glish walnut grove, filling 
sta tions, de p artment store building s, and 
a le ather company •.•• 
~f 17 I p o 9 7 o 
.:;-::· 25 ' p . 68. 
124. 
Many college presidents and 
controllers regard such investments as 
wise. They point to the lower interest 
rates on endowment funds invested in the 
usual way and the serious inflationary 
costs of operating a university today as 
reasons for turning elsewhere for higher 
ret urns .•.• 
About 40 per cent of endowmen~s 
is invested in real property, businesses, 
or commodities. Before the war, less 
than 20 per cent was so invested, the rest 
being in government bonds, or gilt -edged 
sec uri ties •••• 
Oberlin College has made large-
scale purchases of pro pe.rty such as t .he 
Montg omery Ward stores, a number of IJVool-
worth buildings, and Sears Roebuck loca-
tions. The properties have been leased 
back to the businesses on 10 to 40 year 
leases to give the college a "fair return" 
on its investment. The college would like 
to put more of its endowment funds into 
this type of investment. ·:-
Many ot.her types of investments were mentioned, and 
in most ins~ances, it was reported, the businesses were ~rying 
to interest the colleges in such investments. The feeling 
seemed to be present that such holdings might cause some trou-
ble in time of depression, but it seemed to be the feeling of 
educators that the favorable yield at present outweighed the 
long -term possibilit y of financial trouble. Many methods have 
been devised by the colleges and by businesses to mak e such 
ownership possible and of benefit to the colleges. Many col-
leges frown on direct holdings as such, and methods were de-
vised to obtain the income for the exclusive use of the college 
~: .. 26 J p. 1.· 
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with out the colle ge a ctually owning an y of the business in 
question. Among the various methods the following genera l 
p l ans have been found. to. have been most popular. 
1. Acquisition of real estate 
which t .hen usually is leased to t...h e orig-
i n al owner or operated by the instit.ution 
itself. 
2. ownership and opera tion of 
businesses. 
3. Holding companies, estab-
lished by alumni and friends, to own and 
opere.te businesses, the income from which 
goes to the college. 
4. Creation of research and 
patent-h olding corporations, ~he income 
going to supp ort certain university a c-
tivities • .:~ 
Many fina ncial e xpert s and tax auth oriti es were be-
comin g fearful in t he lat e 40's that., unless so me me a s ures 
were t aken , s oon t h e colle ges woul d be cont rol l i ng most of 
U. S . business. It seemed for a time as though their fe a rs 
were wel l -founded. Profits of many corporations were being 
diverte d t .o t he colleges and resulting in no income-tax pay-
ment to the federal and state governments. Even very con-
serva tively man a g ed endowments were ·being lured to invest in 
t h e marvel of t .he tax-free corporation. However, as the use 
of such devices grew, it. became only a matter of time before 
the u. S . Government would step in to p ut a stop t.o further 
revenue losses. ~ test c a se was take n to the U. S . tax court 
;~~ 26) p. 1. 
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involving the c. F. Mueller Company and New York University, 
one of the p ioneers in this type of investment. The court 
ruled in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The court 
held tha t: 
The company was not organized 
and operated exclusively for educational 
purposes--t.he statut.ory requirement for 
exempt.ions. Mueller was primarily set 
up to make ma.caroni. -:~ 
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, in this case, won 
its first round in the battle with the colleges over the tax-
free status of business holdings. Congress had been waiting 
for t .he result of this case, since it wa s under heavy pressure 
to end the tax advantage that tax-exemption afforded this type 
of business and also under pressure from Internal Revenue of-
ficial s to stop the loss of revenue from this source. The 
ruling of the court in this case was construed as broad enougp. 
to imperil similar enterprises operated by o~her colle ges. 
Appeal was made by Mueller to the Court of Ap pea.l s 
and then to the United States Supreme Court, but in both cases · 
the Co mmissioner of Internal Revenue won. By the end of 1950, 
t he meaning for colleges holding such investments was thaL 
li quidation sh ould be effected as soon as practica ble. This 
phase of college endowment. fund investment deserved special 
emphasi s, because it, was an import ant part of the changing 
e mphasis in colle ge investments, even though it e xpe rienced 
-:: 18 I p o 20 o 
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a met eoric rise and a brief span of life. 
2. Residence Halls and Other Real E state Holdings. 
·:Among the other types of investment apart from the 
usual ones of stocks and bonds, colle ges have tried many 
varied and unique ways of investing their endowments in the 
past t wenty years, all wit,b the same purpose--increasing the 
yield to a p oint where it could start ~o meet the needs of 
the colle ge . One of these attempted by many colleges in a 
chan ging world of investment. values was that of investing in 
the college's own residence halls end dormitories. 
Many college officials felt 'that such investments 
might le ad to a happy solution to two financia.l problems: 
1 ) where to find the money to build new dormitories in times 
of ti ght bud gets, and 2) how to invest the endowment funds 
to secure a r easonable y ield. The general plan i n most in-
st ances was for the endowment fund to sup~· l y the c ap ital for 
the d ormitory 's construction, and then in effect, to hold the 
mort gage on it. Still ot h er plans called for the endowment 
fund to be the owner of the dormitory and to receive profits 
from its o pera.tion into the endowment. fund income. 
'while several colle ges have had e x cellent result s 
from such investments, they have been t .he except ion rather 
than the rule. Many have found t ha t t h e buildings have had 
to be practic ally filled in order to yield a profit. Others 
have found tha t on ly modern, efficient units can pay their 
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own way . Perhaps one of the worst dangers fro m such invest-
ment is t hat when the colle ges need their endowment funds the 
most--during period s of depression and with smaller student 
b odies---that is the ti me when y ields from such investments, 
dependin g on students, are at their lowest p oint. The Ameri-
c an Council on .E ducati on Studies found : 
The concensus (of colleges ques-
tioned) is stron gl y e.nd emphat .i cally a-
'a inst. investment of endowment funds in 
residence buildings •... The great majority 
of institutions have had such p oor results 
from investments of endowment funds in 
dormitor ies that such financin g should not 
be regarded as an answer to the problems 
involved.. -;, 
Needless to sa~r, many institutions, while realizing 
that such investments should be avoided as a general rule, 
felt that , with inflation e. ree.l threat and wi th interest 
rates at very low points, such investments were not as dan-
gerous as they might have been if undertaken in the late 20's. 
A study of this probl_em, undertaken at the end of World War II, 
gave some encouragement to the colleges who felt dormitory in-
vestments necessary. Some of its conclusions were: 
1. Nearly two-thirds of the 182 
dormitories reported were said to pay at 
least their own way and a small profit in 
addition. 
2. ! he newer dormitories were 
consistently more prof it a ble than the old 
dormi tories. 
-, .- 5, pp . 16 and 17. 
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3. Profitableness increased 
wi th the size of the dormitories. 
4. .All e x ce pt one person re-
plied that dormitories justified their 
expenses even if they were no~ prOfit-
able financially. * 
It would app ear from studies of this problem that 
the future of investments in dormitories hinges more on prac-
t i c a l considerations at the colleges than on sound fi nanci a l 
p olicies to be followed by an investment committee. At any 
rate, it has been one of t .he many changes brought about by 
the changin g emphasis in investments by the colle ges. 
Another significant cha nge that has t aken place in 
endowment fund i nvestments is the decreasing i mport an ce of 
rea l est a te. Many colle ges which he.d invested heav ily in 
mortgages and real est..at.e ownership in the l a te t wenties were 
force d to foreclose in t .he t hi rties; that situati on tied up 
their fund s in non-income-producing property. The colle ges 
as a wh ole apparently do not wish to be caught in such a pre-
dicament a gain. Those that do invest in rea l estate mort.-
gages a i m for the Government-protected G. I. mortgages wher-
ever possible. 'iiJhen holdings do appear among investments, 
they are oft.en the result of gifts rat.her than colle ge pur-
chase. In many c a se s it i s difficult t .o dispose of such 
gifts under terms of wills, etc. Other colle ges are wait.ing 
for the right. market. in which t.o sell, and at any one time 
.. ,\ 8 , p . 4 7 0. 
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may have some holdings listed. A study in 1944 disclosed the 
following: 
Of those questioned, about 40 
per cent repl.ied that theJr had no. invest.-
ments in real estate, and those that did 
were making no new commitments; 49 per 
cent stated tha.t they were making every 
effort to reduce investments in real es-
tate. Only ll per cent coul.d be inter-
preted as favorable toward real estate 
holdings. -3~ 
3. Mutual. Fund Shares and Insurance From Alumni~ 
Perhaps one other special type of investment deserves 
mention here, even though in total it ranks with the very low-
est dollar expenditures of endowment funds. This type is that. 
of the special gifts from alumni in t.he form of mutual fund 
shares or, in the older version, insurance policies made out. 
to the co ll e ge s • 
For many years colleges such as Yal.e, P rinceton, and 
Wellesley he.d encoura ged graduates to invest in endowment in-
sura.nce policies, payable to t ,he college, and to become parts 
of the endowment fund assets. This type of plan has gained a:. 
certain amount of f avor in the last. few years because it enables 
an individual through consistent saving to present the college 
with a fairly sizable gift., usually at the 25th reunion. The 
idea of investing in mutual fund shares instead. of insurance 
is a newer idea though. 
Carl. W. Knobloch of the Yale 
-l:· 3, p. 14. 
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1.951 class thought that the cl.ass gift 
for the 25th reunion should. be invested 
in mutual fund shares. He convinced 10 
per cent of the class to do so. It is 
a step in a different direction. Knob-
loch would have investment shares on 
hand at the 25th reunion. ~f 
The changing emphasis in class giving may not mean 
/ 
too much in terms of overall endowment. funds, but in some col-
leges such gifts form a very we lcome addition to the portfolios. 
·nlhether the idea of mutua l fund shares will spread or not is 
uncertJain, but this type of investment would seem to offer good 
opportunities for making substantial increases in endowment 
assets. 
.A s pointed out in this chapter , the change in endow-
ment fund investments and investment attitudes has taken some 
interesting turns. One thing seems to have become clearer 
from all the different points, and that is that the colle ges 
are reco gn izing the importance and magnit.ude of the job of 
inve st.ing endowment assets properly. It. is an encouraging 
sign. 
-: ~ 1 5 , p • ]_ 7 . 
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X. Summary .And Conclusions. 
Th e twenty-five year period from 1926 to ~951 se.w 
a gre a t many changes in the field of college and university 
finance. The attempt in this paper has been to note some of 
the more important of these changes, particularly those that. 
have mad e for a r at her de cided brea k fro m t he pa st. The stand-
out changes t hat h a v e t ake n plB.Ce have, for the most pe rt, 
been t.he result of a common c a use --the need for highe r y ield 
on the i n vested funds of the nation's colle ges. In summe.ry, 
the outstanding changes have taken place in the following 
a reas: 
1. The change in investment emphasis; i.e., the 
change from bonds to stocks as the foundation for an endow-
ment investment program. 
2. The growth of di versification policies, brought 
about by the change indicated in (1) above. 
3. The t.rend t .oward compet.ent. investment manage-
ment as reflected in st.rengthened. investment committees, the 
reliance on out side professional aid_ and the increasing use 
of scientific methods of investment. analysis; i.e., t .be use 
of formula plans. 
Since the above three changes have me.rked the pro-
gress and course of American college investment programs, a 
brief summary of t.he major changes in each category follows. 
133. 
A. Bonds To Stocks--A Question Of Yields 
Chapters II to VII have been devoted to an analysis 
of some of the more significant changes whi ch have taken place 
within the portfolios of the colle ges and universities. The 
tables a ccompanying these chapters have been presented with 
the ide a of setting forth the more significant changes in 
graphic form. The t ables and the chapters have de alt with 
change s in type of investment, y ields, rise in dollar v a lue 
of endowment funds, and the ranking of the various comp onents 
of tot a l income. Pronounced changes and trends have been noted 
in all of t.be ab ove. The most important che.nge , however, from 
an investor's viewpotnt has been the changing emphasis in the 
investments themselves • 
.iJ:\ brief review of the changes that have taken p lace 
may highl ught the import ance of this phase of t.he subject. 
In 1 926 , and indeed until t h e stock mark et crash and after, 
re l i ance of sensible and prudent investors wa s placed in the 
reliabl e old stand-by--t.he cor porate bond. Thi s reliance wa s 
well-founded t h r ough out the 1 920 's and the consistent policies 
reflected it. Bond s of hi gh quality and consi stent y ield were 
to be obtained without undue difficulty . Interest ra.tes were 
f a vora bl e and the bonds were of fairl y long-term duration. 
Life was much less comple x for the manager of a college port-
folio. From reports made availab le to this study it was de-
ter mined that for 1926 the average investment in b onds wa s 
134. 
around 70 per cent and many conservatively managed funds had 
considerable higher percentage r at ios in this type of invest-
ment. 
The depression, however, caused a rude awakening in 
colle ge finance offices as elsewhere. The pressure mounted 
from al l sides. On one hand, ~he colleges found their por~­
folios in trouble. First of all, many of the companies whose 
bonds t hey held had been forced out of business in the depres-
sion. S econdly, interest payments were suspended on many of 
the bon ds from formerly sound comp anies. A third unf a vorable 
f a ctor was t .he calling of many bond issues with high interest. 
rates and replacement with bonds of lower y ield and shorter 
term. Other investments had also turned out badly--such as 
investments in mortgages; the colleges found themselves forced 
to foreclose, leaving their money tied up in non-income-
producing assets. 
Pressure was not all from the outside. Inside pres-
sure we.s also exerted during the depression by the colle ge ad-
mini st rat ions, who desperately needed more income from any 
and all sources to compensate for decreased enrollments and 
limited gifts. Following the stress of the depression, an 
added squeeze wa.s placed on college finances; in addition to 
the problem of low yields which continued from t.he depression, 
a new problem arose--that of decreasing purchasing power of 
the dollar. It is little wonder that bold action in new 
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directions was required to kee p the college endowment fund 
a vital factor in collegiate finances. 
A s indicated previously, this pressure was most 
heavily exerted in the direction of incree.sing the yields--
of putting higher -income -producing sec uri ties into the port.-
folios t .o replace the bonds that have ce a se d t o offer favor-
able y ields. 'I' o meet this situation the colle ges turned to 
any t .ype of security that offered a reas onable yield and a 
fair degre e of st ab i li t y a nd safety. The chi ef means of i n -
creasing the ~r ield was fo und to be increa sed inve st ment in 
co mmon stocks . This trend is reflected in the avera ges that 
the colle ges in this study had invested in st.ocks from the 
depression dept.hs to 1951, the last y ear under study. In 
1931, at the start of the depression, the colle ges s t ill had 
ab o ut 60 per c ent in bonds and about. 20 per cent in stocks , 
pr eferre d a nd common . The bond pe rcent age held fairl y steady 
in 1 936, but the stock percentage had increased to about 25 
per cent. By 1941 the average for cor porate bonds h ad dropped 
to about 4.0 per cen t and the stock average had cli mb e d to 
about 3 6 per cent. In 1946 the average percentage in cor-
p orat e bonds had Sli pped to about 20 pe r cen t--U. s . Govern-
ments had entered the picture Rnd stood at about 30 per cen t. 
St ocks had increa sed further t.o about 40 p er cen t of all in-
v estments. The last yea r in t h e study --1951--showed cor porate 
bonds below 20 per cen t, U. S . b onds about 24 per cent, and 
136.. 
stocks stood at abo ut 45 pe r cent. 
The trend in investment. shif ts is obvious even from 
the scant data above. Needless to say, many other factors 
wer e at work in the shift. oth er than those of t he de pression 
cited p rev i ousl y . Bond y ields never did co me back to the 
y ields that prevailed in the 1920's. Inflation replaced de-
pression. The l at ter made the need for favorable yields 
even more press ing t han had the for mer. The day of hi gh in-
terest rates had vanished--at least for a generation or more. 
The trend t .oward replacing high-yield bonds with lower-y ield 
bondsbonds continued. The dearth of f e.vorable bond issues 
continued. The need for income re mained unabated. By the 
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close of World War II, almost a.ll of t h e conservative institutions 
had fallen into line. Co mmon stocks had come to st ay in the col-
lege p ortfolio. The trend continues. # 
B. Increase d Diversification Brought .About ~ 
The Shift T o Stocks 
Th e shifting e mphasis from a mainly bond appr oach to 
one of stocks and bonds brought wi t h it many problems incidental 
to the change . One of the p roblems placed in the finance com-
mittees • hands was that of providing t h e necessary diversifica-
tion within the stock section of the p ortfolio as well as within 
the entire portfolio as a whole. The colle ges reali zed the 
# See Table XXX for the percentages of endowment funds of 
fifteen colle ges at J une 30 , 1952, invested in bonds and 
preferred and common stocks . 
dangers inherent !n connection with the lee.st-secured of the 
t ypes of investment held. Thus the change t ,o sto cks brought 
with it a careful study of the pos s ibil ities offered in this 
type of investment . In fa ct, proper diversification of a 
portfolio is now held to be one of the main principles under-
lying the investment of endowed funds . 
Diversification of the portfolio 
is for the purpose of distributing risks 
over a large number of investment holdings 
in order to minimi ze any losses that may 
occur. This purpose was considered so im-
portant by some of the boards of ~rustees 
of the colleges and universit.ies of this 
study that t .hey characteri zed th~EI.QE.~· 
distribution of risk as being the first 
principle underlying the go od management 
of endowment funds. -:f. 
Since diversification is rated so highly among the 
aims of endowment fund investors, it is evident that th~ pro-
per distribution of risk requires a great. dee.l of time and 
thought. in the select..ion of the var ious investments to con-
s~itute a port folio. Haphazard management will not suffice 
in such a situation. It also indicates that the investment 
of colle ge funds is e. full-time job, and one that requires 
the services of one trained in the field and competent to do 
a superior job. 
The later reports from the treasurers and control-
lers tha t were received in this study ge.ve emphasis to the 
change in thinking about this im portant. job of diversification. 
_,F 1, p . 43. 
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Ma ny colle ges now f urnish to re aders of their financi a l re-
p ort s t able s showing the diversification of the investments 
a n d the rea sons for c h oices rnade. It is little wonder that 
the i n crea.sed use of sound diversification policies has been 
one of the highli ghts of the period under study. Indeed , it 
follows an d hinges upon· the first major change indica ted in 
this chapt e r. As the risk increases (as t h e shift to stock s 
fro m bonds con tinues), the need for utmost care in selection 
of specific sec uri ties incre a ses. This need is met by care-
ful p olici es which in many inst a nces provide for d iversifica-
tion of fiel d of investment and of types of investment within 
e class, geographical distribution of investment, and distri-
bution of maturity dates. 
One of the r e al changes found in colle ge endo V'Jment 
inve s t ment. policies has b een this growing awa reness of the 
ne e d for s ound diversification policies for the maintenance 
of c a pit a l and to p rovide for consistent and fair income rates. 
C. The Rise Of Professional Mana~ent 
Fol lowing in lo gical sequence, the shift to stock s 
made the n eed for d iversification more compelling; in turn, 
the requirements for instituting sound diversification poli-
cies made the need for professional management more urgent. 
The changes in the last. t wenty-five years might be said to be 
both cumulative e.nd py ramidin g . Part-time investment commit-
tees, having placed sizable sums of t h eir endowments in 
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equities, wa.nted to put sound diversif i cation and investment 
management p olicies into operation. Many of them realized 
that these tasks required constant surveillance. H th this 
re a li z ation came the rise of professional investment port.-
folio managers to manage the college investment pro grams . 
The resul~s were two-fold. Most progressive funds 
sought first of all to strengthen the in~ernal organizations 
through placing experts in the fields of banking and finance 
on the committees. The strengthened investment committee in 
turn sought as much outside professional guidance as possible. 
This g uidance took two turns: 1) hiring of firms to manage 
or suggest portfolio changes, and 2) utili z ing progressive 
investment techniques, such as formul.a plans , etc. 
It was found that both a sig-
nifi cantly higher rate of income and less 
fluctuation in income were associated with 
colleges and universities (1) that have 
investment committees, most of whom would 
be classified as s pecialists in the field 
of finance; (2) t hat maintain facilities 
for doing investment research ••.. ~ 
Experience has proved that professional advi ce and 
com petent investment committees can achieve results that are 
well a bove average . ~ga in, the important job of instituting 
and carrying out sound diversification policies depends on 
an investment committee well aware of the tren ds and outlook 
in financial problems. 
·" 1, p . 41. 
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An important factor in diversi-
fication is the ability to make changes 
wi thin the portfolio to meet changing con-
ditions in the business cycle. Members of t 
the investment committee need to keep them-
selves informed constantly with respect. t .o 
changes occurring in business and economic 
conditions. -;<: 
One of the vital changes that have taken place in 
recent ye ars has been this growing awareness of the need for 
competent administration of p ortfolios. Now the successful 
portfolio wh ich re quires only part-time administration is the 
exception rather than the rule. Today college investment 
portfolios stand at all-time highs as far as dollar values 
are concerned and also as far a.s sound management is concerned. 
The following could have been written of many other portfolios 
as well as of the Massachusetts Institute Of Technology. 
The Institute's Corporation rec-
o gnizes that money cannot be expe cted to 
me.nage it self. A Finance Committee, con-
sisting of the Treasurer and five other 
members of the Corporation, has general 
oversight of the investments of I' • I. T. 
The Treasurer is a full-time financial 
and investment officer,and, in consulta-
tion with the Finance Committee, adminis-
ters t.he portfolio •.•• .A s in many past. 
periods of rapid change, the t.ime-t.est.ed 
principles of balanced investing, flexi-
bility, and astute professional. manage-
ment have proved their worth.iH~ 
The foregoin g summary illustrates some of the more 
-::· 1 , p • 69 . 
:;i:· 30, pp. 3 and 4. 
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profound changes that have t .aken place in the field of col-
lege inv estments in the last. t wenty -five years. The. attempt 
of this paper, as st ated in the first chapt.er, ha s been ~o 
note the "chang in g emphasis in college endowment investments" 
(noted in A. of summary p receding ) and t .o potnt out not able 
forward strides in related areas to improve quality, yield, 
an d safety of investment (noted in B. and C. of summary pre-
ced ing ). 
Conclusions which mi ght be re a ched a s a r esult of 
this wor k would p oint to: 
1 . Sounder col le ge financing f rom en owmen t f unds; 
2. · e vital i zed funds which by and l a r ge are pro -
ducing y iel d s n ot too unf avorable in co mparison to those pro-
d uced in an unste.ble era--t.he 1920's; 
3 . "Jell-diversified endowment fund investment--
funds better able to withstand adversity than those of twenty 
yea rs ago; and 
4. The institution of long~ange planning to safe-
g uard y ields and maintain capital investment. 
o ut of the experiences of the past. uncertain y e a rs 
have come many principles for the management of trust funds. 
Two basic prin ciples e mb odied in first-rate funds today are: 
1. Increased holdings of common 
stock s are necessary to improve income and 
offset. declines in purchasing power. 
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2. A well-balanced portfolio 
is the best method of meet.ing any emer-
gency. ~~ 
These two principles might serve as the contribu-
tion of the last few years to the successful management of 
endowment funds. Other principles wh ich have been reinforced 
by events of the last fifteen or t wenty years might include 
the following. 
1. Safety of the p rinciple is 
the primary guiding consideration in the 
choice of investments. 
2. Diversification of all in-
vestments with care not to have a dis-
proportione.t,e amount in any one kind or 
t .oo many maturing in a single period. 
3. Holdings of common stock, 
real e stat.e, and other equities should 
in general be increased when prices a re 
below average and the proport.ion of such 
holdings should be progressively reduced 
as prices advance. ~H~ 
The list of principles might be e xpanded to include 
many more, but the main p oint that should be noted is that en-
dowment funds are being managed in such a way as to give ere-
dence to the reliance on such principles. It should al so be 
noted as a contribution of the past. several years tha.t the 
principles h a ve formed the foundat.ions for successful fund 
operat.ion in co l lege s t,hroughout the country. 
Future trends and changes are to be expected. But 
.; ~ 30, p. 4. 
>:-;:- 29 > p • 241. 
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with inflation still one of the most serious threats f a cing 
investors, it can reasonably be expected that the t .rend to 
stocks will continue. The colleges, as other investors, in 
seeking to protect. their cap ital and the spending power of 
t~eir dollars, must continue to purchase securities which 
will advance in price and value at about. the same rate as 
inflation advances. For formula plan college s, this invest-
ment in equities will probably no~ reach the prop ortioni 
that it may reach in colleges not operating under such devices. 
One other considerat..ion also precludes any switch 
· . . 
from stocks in the immediat.ely forseeable future. This strong 
considera tion is ·t.he one which prompted many colleges to in-
vest i gate the e quities as a possible source of investment 
many years ago. It ts the factor of yield. The pressures 
on colle ges described in the first chapter are continuing . 
If the colleges are to remain open and independent of govern-
mental control, they must not neglect. any and all sources of 
income. Yields must be maintained if the endowment fund is 
to function as formerly in keeping the colleges s.trong and 
free. 
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Table XX 
Total Endowment, Funds Of 45 Institutions 
Years Principal Actual Dollar Rate 
---
..Un millions Income of 
of dollars) (In thousands Return 
.Q.f doll~~) 
1926 ·~' 372 :V19,177 5.14 
1927 408 21,427 5 •. 24. 
1928 449 23,164 5.15 
1929 493 25,137 5.08 
1930 546 28,263 5.16 
1931 572 30,156 5.27 
1932 575 29, 255 5.06 
1933 572 26,290 4. 58 
1934 570 25,032 4. 39 
1935 565 25,047 4.42 
1936 588 25,661 4.36 
1937 619 27 J 684 4.46 
1938 645 28,479 4.4.0 
1939 651 28 '145 4 •. 30 
1940 653 28,924 4.42 
1.94.1 682 30,243 4.43 
1942 687 30' 640 4 .. 47 
1943 702 29,783 4. 27 
Source: 3, P• 32. 
Table XXI 
Percent age Distribution of Endowment Funds of 39 Institutions 
With Endo wment Investments Ove r :;ja 5..~..ooo,ooo 
Distribution of Investments 
Year Bonds Pre- Common Mort- Real Inst it ut. i onal 
--- - --ferred Stock &1~ ~state p 1 an~-L-an9:_ 
§.~ock loans to other 
f unds 
1926 59.7 9.0 9.2 10 .. 1 5.3 5.5 
1927 60.3 8.1 9.1 10.8 5.3 5.1 
1928 60,6 5.3 9.4 13.7 5.6 4.3 
1929 62.0 5.4 9.9 12.7 4.6 4.5 
1930 63.3 3.5 13.2 7.5 7.5 4.2 
1931 63 .0 3.7 14.0 7 . 6 7.1 3.7 
1932 58.7 5.5 13.0 12.4 6.5 3. :3 
1933 59.0 5.5 12.7 11.6 7.2 3.2 
1934 58.4 5.5 13.4 11.1 7.7 3.1 
193 5 57.8 5.5 14.7 9.00 8.7 3.2 
1936 56.3 7.6 15.9 6.7 9.0 3.2 
1937 55.6 8,3 17.4 5.9 8 .8 3.2 
1938 51.1 7.5 23.3 4.6 9.9 1.4 
1 939 49.3 8.6 24.8 4.3 9.7 1.6 
1 940 42. 2 8.2 29.3 4 .1 9.7 1.9 
1941 40.9 10.0 30.9 4.4 9.3 1.9 
1942 40.4 9 .4 31 . 3 4.1 10.3 1.7 
1943 43.9 8 . 8 31.3 3.4 8 .1 1.7 
S ource: 3, p. 33. 
Ot.her 
Inves~.=. 
men t .§. 
1.2 
1.3 
1.1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.9 
0.6 
0.8 
0.8 
1.1 
1.3 
0.8 
2.2 
1.7 
4.6 
2.6 
2.8 
2 .8 
1-' 
~ 
~ 
Table xxir 
Percent a ge Di stri but ion of Endowment Funds of 3 9 Institutions 
With Endowment Investments From £ 2, 000,000 to_i15 , 000,000 
~istribu~ion of Investments 
YeE'.r Bonds Pre- Common Mort - Re,a!_ Institutional 
ferred Stock g.§._ges E state plan"L__and 
---Stock loans to other 
- -
funds ___ 
1926 57.3 12.4 7.8 11.9 3.6 3.5 
1927 58.1 11 . 7 7.6 12 . 9 2.6 3.6 
1928 5.7 .l 9.4 6.4 16. 3 2.7 3 . 6 
1929 55.0 9.7 8.5 16.2 2.6 3.5 
1930 54.3 11.1 9.5 16.0 2 .9 2.4 
1931 50.0 11.4 12.3 14.9 2.9 3.5 
1932 51.9 11.7 13.5 14.3 2 . 1 3.5 
1933 51.9 11.1 13.5 13.9 2.3 3.9 
1934 51.2 11.3 14.5 12.6 3.0 3.7 
1935 50.0 10.6 15.9 ll. 6 3.8 3.5 
1936 49.9 10.7 17.8 10.3 4.0 4.1 
1937 48.3 10. 8 20. 3 8 .8 4 . 1 3.6 
1938 48 .9 12.3 21.5 8.2 4.8 2.1 
1939 45.5 12.7 23.4 7.8 5.2 2.4 
1 940 41. 3 12. 6 25.7 7.5 4 .7 2.6 
1941 42.1 1 2 .9 27.6 7.1 3 .5 3 . 1 
1942 4 2.5 1 3 .1 27.3 6.5 3 .0 3 .3 
1943 44 .7 12.2 27.9 6.0 3.0 2.8 
Source: 
---
3 , p. 33. 
Other 
Invest.::. 
ment§_ 
3 .5 
3.5 
4.5 
4 . 5 
3.8 
5.0 
3.0 
3.4 
3.7 
4.6 
3.2 
4.1 
2.2 
3.0 
5.6 
3 .7 
4.3 
3 .4 
1-' 
.p.. 
()') 
Table XXIII 
:Pe rcentage Distribut.ion of T ot al Portfolios of Bonds, 
Preferred StocksL_and Common S tocks of 130 Institutions 
--by Fields of Investment: 19~1941, and 1943--
Distribution of Inve stments 
United States 
Municipal 
Canadian and Foreign 
Utilities 
Industrial 
RailS 
Others 
Preferred Stocks: 
Utilities 
Industri al 
Rails 
Othe rs 
'I: ot al 
Common S tocl-<:s: 
Utilities 
Industrial 
Ra ils 
Insurance 
Bank 
Others 
Source: 3 , p. 39 . 
8.5 
13.1 
6.6 
11. 3 
2.1 
41.6 
3.2 
4.8 
0.9 
0. 8 
9.7 
2.4 
12.4 
2.0 
_1~ 
21 . 0 
6.3 12 . 1 
2.7 2.2 
1.1 1.2 
10.7 9 .6 
5.4 5.3 
8.9 6.9 
~~ 0.7 
35.9 38.0 
4 . 4 4 .1 
5.1 5.0 
0.7 0.7 
0.2 _ihg 
10.4 10.0 
3.0 2.9 
1.5. 7 16.7 
2.5 1.2 
1.5 1.4 
1.6 2.7 
_Q~ 0.6 
24.8 25. 5 
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Table X.X IV 
Percent age Distribution of Endowment F unds ccord ing T o Class 
of I nves tment --1938 t.o 1943--22 Institutions Holding 
More Than 15 Million Dollars Ea ch 
Distribution __ Of __ _ 
rnve st.ment s 
Bond s 
Preferred Stocks 
Common Stocks 
Mort.ge.ge s (incl. 
R . E . Bonds and 
Stocks) 
Real E ste.te 
Insti tut iona 1 
Propert y 
Personal Loans 
and Notes 
.l;!;ndowment. Funds 
Loaned to other 
Funds 
Other 
Cash 
S ource: 3, p . 38. 
1938 
41.6 
9 .7 
22.0 
5.5 
17.6 
1.0 
0.7 
0.4 
0.5 
1 .. 5 
1 9 39 
40 .3 38 .1 36 . 8 
10. 3 9 . 4 10.3 
22.8 24.8 25.2 
6.5 6.1 6.4 
17.4 16. 5 16.2 
1.0 1.4 2.0 
0 .5 0 . 4 0 .3 
0.1 0.1 0.3 
0.7 0.9 0.7 
0.4 2.3 1.8 
19 42 
3 6.8 39. 3 
10.1 9. 4 
25.4 25.5 
5. 9 5. 3 
16. 8 15.5 
1.9 1 .9 
0.3 0.3 
0.2 0.2 
1.2 1.0 
1.4 l. 6 
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Table XXV 
S ummarv of 59 College Endowment Funds By Fields Of Investment 
(~f Total Endowment Fund ~t Book Value. 1946) 
Cash end U. S. Govt. 
Bonds 
Corporate Securities: 
Utility ~ecurities 
Ra. il road Sec uri t .ie s. 
Industrial Securities 
Bank and Insurance 
Tot a l Corporate Securities 
Foreign Se curities 
Municipal Se curi tie, s 
Real E state and Real 
Est a te Mortgages 
li!i i scellaneous 
Source: 6, p. 16. 
80. Ofo 
31 .0 
30.0 
69.5 
27 .o 
94.0 
9.0 
11.5 
58.0 
6.5 
29.5% 
12.5 
7.5 
29.5 
5.0 
54.5 
1.5 
0.5 
13.5 
0.5 
26.5fo 3.0% 
13.0 
6.5 
29.5 
4.0 
59 .o 
1.0 
0 
9.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Table XXVI 
Rate of Return - -1926, 1936, and 1946--
Based on Gross Income From Assets Covered in S urvey 
~ S cudder, St,evens and Clark 
Maximum Mean Median Minimum 
- ----
1926 (at book value) 9.80% 5 . 00% 4 . 99% 2. 64% 
1936 ( at. book v a lue) 6.54 4 . 24- 4. 25 2 . 00 
1946 (at book value) 6.70 4 . 01 3.90 2 . 50 
1946 (at market value) 5 . 10 3 . 41. 3. 33 2.20 
Source: 6, P• 21. 
-----
Table XXVII 
Proportion of University and Coll~e :E x2,ense s Covered 
By Endowment Fund Income 
(Percentag e of Each Endowment Fund) 
Maximum Mean Median Minimum 
1926 7 6'f~ 32% 34~~ 1. . 5% 
1936 84 32 36.5 2 . 0 
1.946 71. 24. 25 .0 2 . 0 
Source: 6 , P· 23 . 
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Table XXVIII 
Stock Investments Of Twelve Of The Nation•·s Leadi!lg_ 
Uni vers i ties At June 30, 1940 
Universi~ 
Brown Univers ity (a) $11,500,000 
Carnegie Tech. (a) 16,000,000 
Unive rsity of Chicago (a) 77,000 ,000 
Cornell Un iversity 33,000,000 
Dartmouth College (a) 15, 000,000 
Harvard University (a) 134,000,000 
J ohns Hopkins 31,000,000 
Northwestern University 28,000,000 
Princeton Uni versit.y 30,000,000 
St anford University (a) 32,000,000 
Vande rbilt University (a) 23,000,000 
Yale University 89,000,000 
Average 
43.2% 
4.0 
24.1 
48.3 
48.7 
35.3 
24 .6 
21.1 
37.6 
18.3 
12.5 
59.1 
31.4. 
(a) One of the 17 colleges st.udied in this survey. 
Source: 10, p. 319. 
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Table XXI X 
Distribution Of Investments And Rate Of Return Of Institutions Having 
The Best Earn!..!!.g_Records And Those Havi!},g The Poorest E arning...B,§..£ords 
For The Year Ended Jtme ~1940--000 omitted--
P oor·est Record s ~lli_B~rd~ 
Distribution Of Investmen~s 
Bonds 
P referred Stocks 
Co mmon Stocks. 
Mortgages (including real 
estate bonds and stocks) 
Real E state 
Investment in Institutional 
Property 
Personal Loans And Notes 
Endowment Funds Loaned T o 
Other Funds 
Other 
Uninvested Cash 
T ot a l Principal Of Endowment 
Investments 
T ot a l Income Rece ived For 
Year 
verage Rate Of Return 
Sour c e : 5 , p • 34 . 
go In st i t.ut i on s Per 
Earning Cent 
2.30% to 3.19% 
$ 62,793 48.08 
11, 925 9.13 
14,500 11.10 
5,857 4.48 
24 J 77 2 18.98 
3 , 571 2.73 
331 0.25 
2,472 1.89 
573 0.44 
3 ,806 2.91 
1 30 ,600 100.00 
3 , 89 5 
2 .98 
20 Institutions Per 
Earning cen!!_ 
4. 43fo to 5. 8 §.& 
~ 39,166 33.92 
13,967 12.10 
20,147 17.45 
13,739 11.90 
15,044 13.03 
5, 713 4.95 
499 0. 43 
748 o. 66 
4,205 3. 64 
2,219 1. 92 
115,477 100. 00 
5 , 69 7 
4 . 93 
t-' 
()1 
tP> 
. 
T a.ble XXX 
Diversificat ion Of 15 Re:eresent e. tive Colleg e Endowment J:t.., unds 
At Jun e 30~52 
rnsti tut ions Total (1) Bonds Pfd. St ocks Com. Stks. 
Amherst College 
Brown University ( 2) 
Cornell University 
Dartmouth Colle ge (2) ( 3 ) 
Harvard University ( 2) 
Northwestern University ( 4) 
Pennsylvania, University of 
Prince~on University 
Radcliffe University (3) 
Smith College (2) 
Trinity College 
Vanderbilt University ( 2) 
Washi ngton Unlversity 
Williams College (3) 
Yale University ( 3 ) 
Average 
·~ 23, 201 , 413 
15,307,277 
54, 8 47,988 
23,063,63 8 
286,189,1 31 
59,872,924 
40) 327) 791 
69,198,361 
6, 7 69 '003 
11,450,373 
6, 8 67) 828 
28) 495,340 
31,041,586 
15,330,986 
110,926,190 
---
39 .25 
3 2 . 07 
43.40 
39.24 
40.81 
42.93 
29.33 
3 3.70 
45.02 
3 4.53 
24.69 
35.80 
23.27 
3 5.95 
45.74 
39.20 
8.90 
8.74 
5.48 
5.53 
6.23 
.47 
12.08 
13.78 
11.43 
13.11 
5.89 
6.89 
4. 78 
21.72 
14.9.8 
8.46 
51.85 
59.19 
51.12 
55.23 
52.96 
56.60 
58.59 
52.52 
43.55 
52.36 
69.42 
57.31 
71.95 
42.33 
39.28 
52.34 
(1) J\ t market VB.lues, unless otherwise i .ndtcat ed. Excluding real estate, mort-
gages, speci1:1.l endowments, etc. 
(2) One of the colle ges st udied in the p resent survey . 
(3) Book value. 
(4) As of ,Au gust 31, 1952. 
~ource : 87, p. 1. 
1-' 
(}1 
V1 
_Qoll e ge 
Bowdoin (a.) 
Columbia 
Cornell 
DartmotJ.t h (a) 
Harvard (a) 
M. I. T. (a) 
Princeton 
Rochester 
Stanford (a) 
Vassar 
VVelle sley (a) 
Yale 
;!!_verage 
Table XXXI 
Di stribut io!L_Of Twe1_ve_Qolle~ End owment s_l930 and 1936 
~e.§.e d_QQ._ M~rket Value 
T otal 
EndO'Wriient 
6/30/3£ 
·~ 7 • 3 60 • 000 
29 ,300, 000 
25,900,000 
11,550,000 
134 • 7 60 • 000 
35,630,000 
29,630, 000 
53,960,000 
27,140,000 
9,060 ,000 
9 ,380,000 
76.800,000 
Bonds 
19 36 1930 
66. 27o 
26.7 
' 35.1 
49.8 
50.3 
51. 9 
56.3 
57.8 
7 2. 3 
70.1 
74.1 
25.7 
51.9% 
38.5 
37.0 
54.4 
50. 3 
55.7 
64.7 
54 .8 
77.5 
75.6 
8 3 . 0 
31.1 
Rea l Es~at ~ Pfd. Stocks 
1936 1930 1936 1930 
8. 7% 
54.4 
17.2 
8.1 
9.9 
3.9 
11.1 
5.0 
17 . l 
2.4 
0.2 
17.0 
13. 5to 
50.0 
20.0 
6.7 
14.5 
5.1 
11.1 
8 .3 
22 .1 
7.1 
0.9 
21.9 
13.9% 
6.3 
19.6 
6.4 
7.6 
3.2 
16.7 
4 .6 
7.9 
13.0 
8 .6 
24.9 
1 9.9% 
5.6 
15.4 
4.7 
5.9 
4 .9 
1 3 .2 
5.0 
0 .1 
17.1 
3.3 
18.3 
53.0 56 .2 12 .9 1 5. 1 11.1 9.4 
(a) One of the colleges studied in the p resent survey . 
~~~: 11, p. 11. 
Cnm . St ocks 
193 6 1 930 
11. 21; 
12.6 
28. 2 
35 .7 
30 .4 
41.1 
15.9 
32 .6 
2.6 
14.5 
17.2 
30 . 3 
2 2 .7 
14.6% 
6.0 
27.5 
24.2 
22 .7 
31.2 
11.2 
31.9 
0. 4 
0. 2 
l2. 7 
24.6 
18.1 
I-' 
(]1 
()) 
Bonds 
Preferred 
Stocks 
Common 
Stocks 
Total 
Source: 
T a ble XXXII 
Changes In Pro.2ortion Of Typ es Of Securities Hel d 1 930-1936 F or 
The Twelve Colle.ges L isted In Ta.b1e XXXI 
Railroads Public Util. Industrial§: Banks Insuran ce 
193§. l93Q l 936 1930 193 6 193Q 1 936 1930 1936 li.QQ. 
17.4 21.5 19.8 1 8 . 8 8.7 10.8 
0.7 1.4 3.7 3.8 5.4 3.9 
2.2 4.7 2.6 2.5 14.8 8.4 2.4 4.7 1. 8 0.5 
20.1 26.9 26.1 25.1 28.9 23.1 2.4 4.7 1.8 0.5 
ll, p. 11. 
~ 
()1 
-:1 
Table XXXIII 
Comparative Investments Of Fourteen College s_For The 
Ye a rs Ended Jwne~0 4 19 30 , 1940, and 1950 
Colle~ Total Yield Pe rcent age Invested In~ 
Cl 'fhousand) Bonds Pfd s. f.Ql!!.:.. Other 
Amherst Colle~ 
1950 iii 25,655 4.46.% 32.6 8.4 54.3 4.7 
1940 16.459 4.30 41.6 14.7 37.2 6.5 
1930 7, 893 ·>~ 4. 68 81.9 4.8 2.7 10.6 
Carnegie Inst. of Tech . 
1950 31,554a 3 . 81 61.9 10. 3 27.8 b 
1 940 16, 367a 4.19 93.9 3.3 2.8 b 
19 30 16,1 30 ~~ 5 .04 100.0 0.0 0.0 b 
Chi c agoL-Univ.:.._Qf 
1950 109 I 2 58 4 . 90 3 3.3 6. 8 36.5 23 . 4 
1 940 71,123 4 .40 29. 8 8.4 25 . 5 3 6.3 
19 30 76.667 5 . 40 28 .3 2 . 7 28 . 9 40.1 
Cornell Universitv 
19 50 52,275a 4.22 37.2 8 . 3 38.3 16.2 
1940 27,ll6a 4.08 30.7 20.4 28 .0 20.9 
1930 23 , 622a 5.52 3 5.7 23.1 16.2 25.0 
Harvard Univers~ 
1950 247,095 3. 69 20.7 7.5 43 .8 28.0 
1940 1 3 ?, 990 4. 51 41.4 10.0 31.6 17.0 
1930 108,000 5. 20 45.1 6.0 23 .8 25.1 
(cont. next page) 
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T able XXXIII - continued 
Col leg~ Total Yield Percentage Invested In: 
( l _ThoU§c~nd) Bonds Pfds . Com. Other 
--- --- --
Johns Ho:ekins Univ . 
1950 ·" 40 645 'IP J 3.90 47 .o 9.7 36.7 6.6 
1940 27 J 091 4.36 60.0 7 . 7 18.5 13.8 
1930 27,500 5. 27 74.0 .••• 8 . 0 .•.•• 18.0 
Mass . Inst. of Tech. 
1950 53,130 3. 38 32.8 0.4 40.9 25.9 
1940 31 t 832 4.32 43.7 4.1 44.0 8.2 
1930 32, 902 -lic 5. 37 65.3 . . • 28. 2 ..•.• 6 . 5 
Penna. 1 Univ. of 
1950 35,856 4.46 37.7 13. 6 48.7 b 
1.940 1_8' 511 5.36 54.1 30.1 15.8 b 
1930 17 J 543~<- 5.47 60.1 31.2 8.7 b 
Stanford Universit~ 
1950 (Aug. 31 35 J 702 4 .• 30 52.0 9.0 39.0 b 
1940 (Aug. 31) 19,097 4.26 65.0 14.0 21.0 b 
1930 (Aug. 31) 22, 244 ->;- 4.75 100.0 o.o o.o b 
Texas, Univers~_Qf. 
1950 (Aug. 31) 111 J 554 ~~ 2.58 97.8 0.2 0.8 1.2 
1940 ( Aug. 31) 33, 311 -;;- 3.31 93.3 o.o 0.1 6.6 
1930 ( ,A ug. 31) 18, 784 ·:~ NA 98.4 o.o 0.1 1.5 
Vanderbi1~ Universitl 
1950 36,403a 4.14 51.1 5.3 31.2 12.3 
1940 (.Apr. 30) 24, 322a 4.03 54.1 7.9 23.9 14.4 
1930 ( ~pr. 30) 19 J 545 ·:~ 4.28 86.8 3.4 1.6 8.2 
(cont. next page) 
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Table XXXIII - continued 
Qolle~ T ota.l Yie ld Percen~e I n vest ed In: 
c gp Thousand ) Bonds Pfd..2.!_ 
Vassar College 
1950 $ 17,043 3. 70 54.0 18.0 
1940 9,507 4 . 20 56.8 12.9 
1930 7,814 5.20 75. 6 17.4 
Williams Colle Be 
1950 16,850 3. 92 33.5 17.1 
1940 10,059 4.16 39.0 14.2 
1930 7 I 682 4 .12 65 .6 4.5 
Yale Univers!...!!.Y. 
1 9 50 102, 698 a 4.66 44 .4 15.6 
1940 60 ,047a 4. 3 2 46 .0 23.0 
1 930 62, 4 59a 5.1 8 42 .4 22.5 
Avera ges, 1 9 50 4 .01 45 . 4 9. 3 
Note: All fi gures represent mark et v alues unle s s otherwise i ndicated . 
-::· All f igures based on book values. 
a Yield based on bo ok value. 
b Othe r investments not. included e x ce pt in determining y ield. 
S o ~r c e : 14 , p • 5 . 
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26.8 1.2 
28.0 2.3 
0.0 6.0 
43 .8 5.4 
31.7 15.1 
12.0 17.9 
40.0 b 
31.0 b 
3 5.1 b 
36.3 
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161. 
~ppendix B 
1. Berea College 
2. Bowdoin College 
3. Brown Universit y 
4 . Carnegie Institute of Technology 
5. Cathol ic University of Ameri ca 
6 . University of Chicago 
7. Da rtmouth College 
8 . F a.mil ton College 
9 . P a rvard Univers ity 
10. Massa chusetts Institut e of T echno~ogy 
ll. New ~: ork Un i versity 
12. Oberlin College 
13. Smith College 
14. Stanford University 
15. Union Theolo gical Se mina ry 
16. Vande r bilt University 
17 . Wellesley Coll e ge 
162. 
130 Institutions In The Composite Study .Bv T he .American 
Co uncil On Educati on S tudies 
Alabama , University of 
.. 6. l bion Colle ge 
lfre d University ( a) 
Amhe r s t Coll ege 
Atlanta University 
Baldwin ~Valla ce College ( a ) 
Be.r nar d College 
6 aylor University 
Beloit Col lege 
Bennington Colle ge 
Be rea College (a) (b) 
Bethany College (a) 
Boston Uni ve r s it y 
Bowdo in College (a) (b) 
Bradley P olyt echnic Institute 
Bro wn University ( a ) (b) 
Br yn Ma wr Colle ge 
Buckne l l University 
Ca.lif ornia, Uni ver si ty of 
California Institute of T echnology 
Carleton College 
Carne g ie I .n stitute of T echnolo gy (a) ( b) 
Ca rroll Colle ge (a) 
163. 
Case S ch oo l of Appl i e d S cien ce 
Chattanooga , Univer sity of ( a ) 
Chicago, Unive r s ity of (a) (b) 
Cincinnati, Universit y of 
Claremon t Col le ge 
Col by Colle g e 
Col gate Univer s it y ( a) 
Col gat.e-Rochester Divinity S chool 
Col ors.d o Coll ege 
Columbia Universit y (a) 
Converse Colle ge ( a ) 
Corne l l Colle ge 
Cornell University 
Da r tm o uth Colle ge ( a ) (b) 
Davi d son Colle ge (a) 
De nison Uni ve rs i ty 
ePauvv Ur!i ver s i t y 
Dick inson Col le ge (a) 
Drew Universit y 
Franklin a n d Marshall Colle ge (a) 
George Wa shington Un iversit y 
Hamilton Col l e ge (a) (b) 
Hampton Instit ute 
Hartford S e min a ry 
Harva r d Un i ve rsit y (a) (b) 
1 64 . 
Haverford Colle ge 
Hiram College 
I d a ho, Colle ge of 
Il linois, University of 
I nd i e.n a University 
Johns Hopk ins University 
Keny on Colle g e 
Knox Colleg e (a) 
Lafay et t e Colle ge (a) 
Lawrence Col le ge ( a ) 
Lebanon Valley College (a) 
Lehi gh University 
Louisville, University of 
Mac a l e ster Colle ge 
Masse.chu setts Institute of Technology (a) (b) 
Michi gan , Universit y of 
Midd lebury Colle ge 
Mills Colle ge 
Mi nne s ot a , Un iversity of 
Missouri, University of 
Mount Holy oke Uolle ge (a) 
New York University (a) (b) 
Northwestern University 
Oberlin College (a) (b) 
Pen nsy lvan i a, University of 
165. 
Pittsburgh, University of (a) 
Pomona College 
Princeton University 
Puget Sound, College of 
Radcliffe College 
Redlands, University of 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 
Rice Institute 
Richmond, Un iversity of 
Rochester, University of 
Russell Sage College 
Rutgers University 
St. Catherine's College 
St. Lawrence University 
Scripps College 
Smith College (a) (b) 
South, Uni ver si ty of (a) 
So uthern California, University of (a) 
Southern Methodist University 
Spelman College 
Stanford University (a) (b) 
Swarthmore College 
Syracuse University 
Teachers College, Columbia University 
T axa~, University of 
166. 
Trinity College 
Tufts College 
T ulane University 
Tulsa, University of (a) 
Tuskegee Institute 
Union College 
Uni on Theolo g ical Seminary (e.) (b) 
Vanderbilt University (a) (b) 
Vassar College 
Villanova College 
Virginia, University of 
abas.h College 
\'ake Forest College 
Washingt.on University 
'·ellesley College (a) (b) 
·vell s College 
Wesleyan Uni ve rsi ty 
We stern Reserve University 
Whe at on College 
Villiam Jewell College (a) 
Williams College 
Wilson Colle ge 
Wittenberg Colle ge 
Wofford Colle ge (a) 
Wooster, College of 
167. 
Wyoming, University of 
Yale Uni versi t.y 
Yankton College (a) 
(a) one of the 39 colleges analyzed in dete.il by the American 
Council on Education Studies . 
(b) One of the 1.7 colleges analyzed in this study. 
S ou~~= 3, pp. 28-30. 
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